PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

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Shanghai Upheaval

Evelyn Anderson

Soviet Agriculture

Karl-Eugen Wädekin

CASTRO AND REVOLUTION

Kevin Devlin

BOOKS: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi

HISTORIOGRAPHY: Stalin & Hitler

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The Permanent Revolutionism of Fidel Castro

By Kevin Devlin

"This revolution will never be anyone's satellite or be subjected to anyone's conditions . . . it will never ask anyone's permission to maintain its posture, whether it be in ideology or in domestic or foreign affairs."—Fidel Castro, March 13, 1967.

H. L. MENCKEN once remarked that no married woman could ever have absolute trust in her husband: the utmost she could achieve, said the sage of Baltimore, was "the wary confidence of the American pickpocket that the policeman on the beat will stay bought." The Soviet leaders have learned from hard experience that in the case of Fidel Castro such wary confidence would be misplaced—the charismatic leader of the Cuban revolution simply will not stay bought, even at the rate of an estimated one million dollars a day.

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The root of the trouble lies in the fact that Castro is not content to be the leader of the Cuban revolution. Driven both by an evident sense of personal destiny and by a shrewd perception of self-interest, he openly aspires to leadership of the Latin American revolution, looking to a day when the Cordillera of the Andes will be the Sierra Maestra of a continent aflame with anti-Yanqui passion.

By the mid-1960's this claim to regional leadership—together with a rare combination of political independence and economic dependence—had given the Cuban regime a unique place in the new, increasingly diversified international Communist movement. If the regional role is unique, so are the ideological and organizational issues which it raises. In no other part of the world have non-Communist forces become so deeply involved in the transformation of communism; nowhere else does one find such complex patterns of factionalism, such shifting networks of left-wing relationships.

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Cuba is the key piece in that kaleidoscopic and bewilderingly intricate mosaic.

Communism Sui Generis

Castro's victory over a corrupt dictatorship was in itself a refutation of Leninist teaching on the avant-garde role of the Communist party, enabled by its command of "scientific" doctrine to interpret and shape historical developments. The "old" Cuban Communist party, the People's Socialist Party (PSP), scrambled onto the Castroist bandwagon at the eleventh hour, having previously criticized the guerrilla struggle against Batista as "adventurist"—a lesson which other Latin American Communist parties have not forgotten. For a time after Castro proclaimed his faith in Marxism-Leninism, it seemed that the Communists were in the process of taking over the regime by dominating the Integrated Revolutionary Organization (ORI), formed in 1961 by the merger of the PSP and Castro's July 26 Movement. But in March 1962 Castro suddenly ousted and exiled Anibal Escalante, the Communist who controlled the ORI machine; and from then on old-guard Communists like Blas Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez retained their posts in the top leadership by hewing to Castro's line.[1]

A basic feature of that line, clearly expressed in Castro's Second Declaration of Havana (1961) and in Che Guevara's work *La guerra de guerrillas* (1960),[2] was a regional emphasis on revolutionary voluntarism. This call to arms, strengthened by the intoxicating example of the "First Territory of Free America," made a considerable appeal to rank-and-file Communists throughout South America. It also appealed to a few of the Communist leaderships, particularly in the period between the Bay of Pigs debacle of April 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of November 1962. Prominent among those who rallied to the call was the leadership of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), which in 1961 had joined the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and other radical-leftist elements in Venezuela to form the National Liberation Front (FLN). This was the political arm of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), which embarked on a campaign of rural guerrilla fighting and urban terrorism with the declared aim of overthrowing the reformist government of the ex-Communist President Romulo Betancourt. The Venezuelan guerrillas were hailed by both the Russians and the Chinese—with the result that in 1963-64 the PCV adopted a distinctly neutralist position in the Sino-Soviet conflict. But the most enthusiastic support came from the beleaguered revolutionary citadel across the Caribbean—and it was not merely moral support: in late 1963 a huge cache of arms shipped from Cuba was discovered on the Venezuelan coast.

As it turned out, however, the PCV leadership was far from wholeheartedly united in its commitment to violence[3]—particularly after the striking failure of the FLN's attempt to intimidate voters in the elections of December 1963, in which a turn-out of more than 90 percent of the Venezuelan electorate chose another reformist Democratic Action president, Raul Leoni, to succeed Betancourt. Two years of internal party dissension followed, resulting in an eventual split in the leadership and a flagrant attempt at intervention by the Cubans (more on which shortly). These developments have emphasized anew the question of Cuba's role in Latin America—and in the international Communist movement.

Havana and Moscow

The Caribbean missile crisis of October 1962 was not only a watershed in the history of the Cold War but a turning point in Cuban-Soviet relations. The settlement of the crisis by the Soviet and United States leaders over Castro's head was of course a humiliating blow to his prestige and his regional revolutionary stature; but there was another side to it. Under the settlement, restoring the mutually acceptable limits of super-power confrontation in

[1] After the expulsion of Escalante, Castro carried out an extensive purge of the country's political and economic apparatus. Thus, all six of ORI's provincial secretary-generals were old-guard Communists; two acceptable to Castro were allowed to keep their posts and the rest were removed. The ORI itself was replaced by the Castroist-dominated United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURSC), which had still not held its founding congress when it became the Cuban Communist Party in October 1965.

[2] English edition, *Guerrilla Warfare*, New York, 1961. Guevara's main theses were that the "subjective conditions" for a successful revolution could be created by determined action, even when they did not exist beforehand, and that in Latin America the best hope of success lay in mobilizing the peasantry and not the urban proletariat. Both arguments clearly challenged the theory and practice of almost all the Latin American Communist parties.

[3] In an interview broadcast by Havana Radio on November 19, 1966, the Venezuelan guerrilla leader Eliás Manuit said that the PCV leadership's decision in 1962 to launch an armed struggle was taken by a majority of one vote.

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the Caribbean as in Berlin, the Soviet Union agreed not to try to make Cuba a potentially offensive base of Soviet power, while the United States agreed not to invade the island. The outcome of the crisis therefore removed the main obstacle to Soviet acceptance of Castro's claim, first made in April 1961, that his was a socialist regime, and hence part of the socialist camp.

The negotiated acceptance of Castro's membership application took place during his first visit to Russia in April-May 1963. But Castro did not come to Moscow cap in hand. The joint communique which registered the outcome of the talks was a compound of compromises, concessions and covert bilateral opportunism.[4] In this it set the pattern for the shifting balance of convergent and divergent interests which has characterized Soviet-Cuban relations, and which has been remarkably little affected by Cuba's economic dependence on the USSR. Thus, a few months after the Moscow agreement, Cuba—alone among the "pro-Soviet" regimes—refused to ratify the nuclear test-ban treaty (which Castro clearly regarded as an ominous exercise in Soviet-American detente); and while the Sino-Soviet conflict sharpened during the second half of 1963, Cuba reaffirmed its neutralism.[5] On the other hand, the Cuban emphasis on revolutionary voluntarism was modified during the year or so following Castro's visit to Moscow.

In 1964, however, Latin American developments —notably the Brazilian coup in April and President Frei's electoral victory in Chile in September, which dashed Brazilian and Chilean Communist hopes of advancing on the "peaceful road"—led Castro gradually to resume his regional role, never really abandoned, as champion of the guerrilla struggle. At the same time the fall of Khrushchev (accepted by the Cubans with noncommittal equanimity) offered the opportunity for another reappraisal of Cuban relations with the USSR and with the "old guard" party leaderships of Latin America. Following a meeting of Latin American Communist parties held in Havana toward the end of 1964, a joint communique was issued indicating that the pro-Soviet parties had pledged themselves to step up the campaign of "solidarity with the people and government of Cuba . . . giving it an even more decisive and organized character."[6] They also promised more "active support" to the armed struggle in certain selected countries: "the Venezuelan, Colombian, Guatemalan, Honduran, Paraguayan and Haitian fighters" were specifically mentioned. In return, the Cubans recognized the right of each party to determine its own path in accordance with local circumstances. Without abandoning their neutralist stance, the Cubans also accepted generally pro-Soviet formulas (such as the call for an end to public polemics), including one on the international conference issue which implied that they would, after all, attend the "preparatory" meeting to be held in Moscow in March 1965. Perhaps the most significant phrase in the communique, however, was one condemning "all factionalist activity, whatever its character or source." This was obviously directed against the Chinese (secessionist pro-Chinese Communist parties already existed in Brazil and Peru, and were soon to appear in Colombia and Bolivia, while Maoist factions were active in most other Latin American countries). But, as the phrase "whatever its character or source" suggested, it also applied to the Cubans—and two years later the Venezuelan CP was to accuse Castro of violating this agreement. In short, an attempt was made to institutionalize Cuban relations with the other parties and to place limitations on Castro's claim to regional leadership. Given geopolitical realities and the character of the Cuban revolution, the attempt was bound to fail, and sooner rather than later.

Trouble in Venezuela

Even as the communique was being drawn up, the Venezuelan guerrilla struggle, on which Castro placed such high hopes, was already faltering and becoming a source of intraparty dissension. The

[4] *Pravda*, May 25, 1963. In this communiqué the Russians belatedly recognized the Cuban regime as a "socialist" one, but with a special status: it did not belong to Comecon or to the Warsaw Pact, so that Cuban-Soviet relations would be a matter for repeated bilateral settlement. The compromises in the communiqué were fairly obvious. Thus it gave full Cuban approval to the Soviet treatment of the missile crisis; against that, it described Castro's First and Second Declarations of Havana as being "of historic significance for the national liberation struggles of the people of Latin America," but qualified this in turn by noting that it was for each national revolutionary vanguard to decide its own form of struggle (*i.e.*, peaceful or violent). It expressed the Soviet line on such ideological issues as peaceful coexistence; on the other hand, it made no mention of the Albanian rebels whom the Cubans had refused to condemn.

[5] Significantly, it was the "old Communist" organ, *Hoy* (October 2, 1963) and not the "Castroist" *Revolución*, organ of the July 26 Movement, which was chosen to make the declaration that "Cuba wishes to maintain fraternal links with the entire socialist world, and will not allow itself to be separated from this or that country which is part of it." In November 1963 the Cubans gave practical expression to this stand by sending a diplomatic mission to Tirana.

[6] *Pravda*, Jan. 19, 1965.

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reason was that Castroist voluntarism was not standing the test of reformist reality: it had become increasingly clear during 1964 that the guerrilla-terrorist campaign was not going to succeed, and was merely antagonizing the Venezuelan masses. In April 1965 the seventh plenum of the PCV Central Committee reflected the leadership's dilemma—while reaffirming the party's commitment to the guerrilla alliance, it also adopted a five-point "minimum program" acceptable to "the majority of the people," aimed at achieving a "democratic peace," in which the PCV and the MIR would function as legal opposition parties.[7]

This attempt to combine incompatible postures began to collapse in January 1966. At the same time that the Venezuelan (FLN) delegation to the Tricontinental Conference in Havana was joining in a Castroist chorus of commitment to revolutionary violence, three imprisoned leaders of the PCV—Secretary-General Jesus Faría and the brothers Gustavo and Eduardo Machado—were drafting a document urging the abandonment of the guerrilla struggle. Thereafter events moved rapidly toward an open split and Cuban intervention.

In March 1966 Faría was released from prison under a conditional amnesty and went into exile in Moscow. In the same month Douglas Bravo, guerrilla commander and leader of the hardline faction, issued a "Manifesto of Iracara," calling for an intensification of the armed struggle; the PCV Politburo promptly moved to suppress it.[8] Early in April 1966 the eighth plenum of the Central Committee decided to "abandon the armed struggle in order to incorporate the party in the movement for the integration of the national Left," as a Politburo spokesman put it.[9] A few weeks later Bravo and four other guerrilla commanders notified the Politburo that they had decided to reorganize the FLN and the FALN "provisionally" under a separate politico-military leadership. In reply the Politburo issued a bulletin (May 18, 1966) condemning Bravo for having "arbitrarily proceeded to establish a parallel and objectively divisive center," [10] and suspended him from the Central Committee (expulsion from the party was to follow).

At this point the Cubans intervened, extending recognition and open support to the dissident guerrillas, and publicizing hard-line statements issued by a permanent mission which the dissidents had established in Havana. In late August 1966 the PCV Politburo sent the Cuban Central Committee a letter protesting bitterly against "the open support given by leaders of the Cuban CP to factionalist elements; . . . [against the] displacement of the legitimate representatives of our party in the posts to be created within the secretariat of the Tricontinental Organization, in the Latin American Solidarity Organization and in other bodies, [posts] which without any doubt belong to us; . . . and [against] the acceptance [by Cuba] of a seditious 'delegation of the FALN.'" [11]

The Cuban response to this protest was to step up support for the Venezuelan dissidents, who were described by Cuban spokesmen and media as "true Communists" in rightful rebellion against the capitulationist policies of the "pseudo-revolutionaries." The interparty quarrel reached a climax with a speech by Castro on March 13, 1967, in which he denounced the PCV leaders as "accomplices of imperialism." This phillippic amounted to a declaration of ideological and organizational war against a fraternal party; more important, Castro raised issues which went far beyond the Cuban-Venezuelan feud, posing a challenge in continental—not to say global—terms:

> **Our position regarding Communist parties is based strictly on revolutionary principles. Those parties which unhesitatingly follow a revolutionary line we will support in spite of everything. Those parties which call themselves Communist or Marxist and believe themselves to have a monopoly on revolutionary feeling, but who are really monopolizers of reformism, we will not treat as revolutionary parties. If in any nation those who call themselves Communists do not know how to fulfill their duty, we will support those who—even though they do not call themselves Communists—behave like real Communists in the struggle. . . . What defines a Communist is his action against oligarchies, action against imperialism and, *on this continent, action in the armed revolutionary movement.*** [12]

In their official reply to this "ignoble and overbearing" speech, the Venezuelan Communist leaders lashed out against Castro's presumptuousness in claiming the right to decide who was and who was not a "true Communist." Accusing him of setting

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[7] See Saverio Tutino, "Incontro con i comunisti nel territorio libero universitario," *L'Unità* (Rome), Sept. 26, 1965.

[8] For an analysis of the manifesto from a right-wing viewpoint see the supplement to *Este y Oeste* (Caracas), June 15-30, 1966. (*Translations on International Communist Developments* [TICD]. Washington, DC, No. 871, pp. 162-80.)

[9] See "Il P. C. venezolano cesserà la guerriglia?," *Avanti!* (Rome), April 8, 1966.

[10] The bulletin was published in *Confidencial* (Caracas), No. 32 (TICD, No. 895, pp. 13-16).

[11] See *La Republica* (Caracas), Sept. 3, 1966 (TICD, No. 889, pp. 125-29).

[12] Supplement to *Granma* (weekly English edition), March 19, 1967; emphasis added.

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himself up as "an untouchable revolutionary oracle," the statement proclaimed the "absolute independence" of the PCV: if an "anarchic adventurous group" was willing to submit to Cuban directives, the Venezuelan Communist Party was not.[13]

This was like erecting a barbed-wire fence to keep out the tide. Some weeks later a young Cuban was killed and two others captured as they landed on the Venezuelan coast with a group of native guerrillas. Castro's reply to subsequent charges of aggression was to convene his Central Committee (for the first time) and issue a belligerent statement boasting that "we have aided and will continue to aid all those revolutionary movements which are struggling against imperialism, in whatever part of the world."[14] In other words, Cuban intervention in the internal struggle of the Venezuelan Left would go on.

The Cuban stance, and the justification advanced for it, challenged the interests not only of the Venezuelan party but of all the Communist leaderships of Latin America. Even the most militant of them could not accept the subversive doctrine that revolutionary violence was the only criterion of a party's vanguard role. Thus, the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), one of the few Communist parties conducting a guerrilla struggle,[15] hastened to dissociate itself from a statement in which two of its representatives in Havana hailed the March 13 speech as "epoch-making in its exposure of pseudo-Marxists and pseudo-revolutionaries."[16] The Guatemalans were clearly disturbed by the Cuban leader's insistence that the title of "avant-garde" did not belong to a national Communist party by prescriptive, doctrinally-based right, but had to be won by revolutionary action—and that a non-Communist movement could pass the test while Communists failed.

The Tricontinental Conference

Castro's March 13 speech confirmed what was already obvious: that the quarrel between the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties, sensational though it was, was merely part of a wider pattern of regional developments. The dominant motif of this pattern has been the growth of "Castroism" as an independent force—one which has had a radically disruptive impact on the traditional Communist order in Latin America since the early 1960's, and particularly since the Havana Tricontinental conference of January 1966.

At the time it was held, the Havana conference seemed to many observers to be dominated by the familiar Sino-Soviet confrontation—an impression strengthened by conflicting propaganda claims, and also by the struggle over such basic issues as voting procedures (the Chinese unsuccessfully pressing for the "unanimity-veto" formula) and the formation of a new tricontinental organization (with which the Russians vainly hoped to replace the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization). In fact, however, the one who gained most from the conference was the *tertius gaudens*—Fidel Castro. This was not merely due to the emphasis placed on revolutionary voluntarism—*à la cubaine* and not *à la chinoise*—in the conference resolutions. More important was the fact that the conference gave Castro the institutional means for promoting his policies both regionally and, to a lesser extent, internationally.

Opportunistic Chinese support—given despite the public rift announced by Castro's denunciation of the Peking regime on the eve of the conference[17]—helped to make Havana the headquarters of the new Tricontinental Secretariat instead of Cairo (the Soviet delegation had initially supported the Egyptian claim). Havana was also made the headquarters of two other new organizations: a Latin

[13] The statement, signed by seven PCV Politburo members, was published in *Ultimas Noticias* (Caracas), March 17, 1967.

[14] *Le Monde* (Paris), May 20, 1967.

[15] In Colombia Communists conduct one of the two lingering guerrilla campaigns (the other being led by the Castroist Movement of Workers, Students and Peasants—MOEC), but the party still holds that "guerrilla action is not at present the principal form of struggle" (interview with Secretary-General Vieira in *L'Humanité*, [Paris] June 3, 1966). Even in Guatemala Communist commitment to the guerrilla struggle has been wavering in the face of army action and counter-terrorism by right-wing organizations. Thus, in a *World Marxist Review* article of February 1967 a party spokesman, José Manuel Fortuny, emphasized that the election of the reformist President Mendez Montenegro in 1966 had opened up new opportunities for "open, legal organization of the masses" in conjunction with a continued armed struggle, and added pointedly, quoting a Central Committee resolution, that if the Army stopped anti-guerrilla operations, the guerrilla force (FAR) would confine itself to "retaliatory action in the event of repressions."

[16] Letter signed by Gabriel Salazar and José Maria Ortiz Vides, *Granma* (English edition), March 26, 1967.

[17] Castro attacked the Chinese on Jan. 2, 1966, for having cut rice-for-sugar exchanges; a month later (in *Granma*, Feb. 6, 1966) he stepped up the attack, accusing them not only of "criminal acts of economic aggression" but of attempting to subvert Cuban officers and officials by disseminating propaganda through Peking's Havana embassy. The sugar-rice trade was later quietly resumed. Significantly, Castro's attack was not couched in ideological terms, nor was it part of a sustained campaign: he maintained his neutralist posture.

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American Solidarity Organization (OLAS) to provide support for national liberation movements throughout the continent and a committee for aid to such movements throughout the world. A Cuban leader, Osmany Cienfuegos, later became secretary-general of the Tricontinental Secretariat—on which neither the Soviet Union nor China was represented—and another Cuban, Haydée Santamaria, was named secretary-general of the OLAS.

Cuban activities before, during and immediately after the conference foreshadowed the bold use that the regime was to make of these institutional levers. The decisions of the International Preparatory Committee on the accreditation of delegations showed Cuban influence more clearly than that of either the Russians or the Chinese.[18] During the meeting itself Castro organized a sort of conference within a conference, holding prolonged discussions behind closed doors with the Latin American delegations, during which he reportedly urged on the Jacobin Left the regional lessons of the Cuban revolution. In the months following the conference the Cubans asserted their independent revolutionary line by attacking Yugoslavia (no longer a Communist regime, declared *Granma* flatly), the pro-Chinese factions ("paper revolutionaries"), Latin American governments both rightist and reformist, and the "peaceful-way" illusions of unnamed fraternal parties. They were more guarded in their criticism of the Soviet Union; but Castro cut close to the bone in a May Day speech in which he questioned whether "any nation can undertake the building of communism in a single country, without productive forces and technology being first developed in the rest of the underdeveloped countries." [19]

The Cuban line continued to harden. In August Castro acquired another important organizational lever, when the Latin American Student Congress convened in Havana to hear Armando Hart preach the gospel of regional violence, and proceeded to set up a permanent Havana-based organization (OCLAE) with the aim of "promoting the fighting solidarity of Latin American students in their struggle against imperialism." [20] At the same time the Cubans were pressing for the formation of national committees of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS)—often with the enthusiastic participation of the Jacobin Left, while local Communists dragged their feet. Declarations by the Havana secretariats of the OCLAE, the OLAS, and the tricontinental organization regularly followed the militant Cuban line—as when the last announced in November 1966 that, in accordance with a hitherto secret resolution of the Tricontinental Conference, Cuba and North Korea were setting up "schools for the training of political cadres for the revolutionary movements" of their respective continents.[21]

The "Solidarity" Conference

The most significant development, however, was the Cuban regime's careful preparation, beginning in the fall of 1966, for the "First Latin American People's Solidarity Conference," eventually held in Havana from July 31 to August 10, 1967.[22] Organizationally and ideologically, the OLAS conference was "rigged"; the Castroist outcome was preordained. A number of important Latin American Communist parties either were not invited or did not come—those of Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and Ecuador, for example. Only three delegations, those of Uruguay, Costa Rica and El Salvador, were controlled or dominated by moderate, old-guard Communists. Some eight to ten others were divided between moderates and hard-liners, and were consequently hamstrung on critical issues by the rule that each delegation had only one vote and must reach agreement in order to cast it. A majority of the delegations was Castroist-dominated, Jacobin leftists surrendering happily to the overwhelming ambiance of revolutionary voluntarism expressed in the conference's slogan, "The duty of a revolutionary is to make revolution."

But if Castroist sentiment was dominant, it did

[18] The Cubans would have joined the Chinese in excluding Yugoslav observers, and the Soviets in excluding all Latin American pro-Chinese factions except the Dominican MPD. Again, they supported the Mexican Castroist MLN's opposition to the accreditation of Lombardo Toledano's PPS, which led to the withdrawal of the pro-Soviet Mexican CP.

[19] *Granma* (English edition), May 8, 1966.

[20] *Ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1966.

[21] Radio Havana, Nov. 18, 1966.

[22] An important feature of this tactical planning was the preparatory committee's circulation of detailed questionnaires about social, economic, political and cultural conditions in individual countries. By March 1967 these requests for data had gone out to 197 "progressive" groups throughout the continent—of which number the official Communist parties could account for no more than one-fifth at most—and an OLAS official was explaining frankly that the purpose was to "establish a common revolutionary strategy for Latin America" (*New York Times*, March 27, 1967). By the time the OLAS conference opened, the interim results had been compiled in 14 volumes, and a large staff in Havana was at work upon what had become a permanent research project, in the service not of sociology but of regional revolution.

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not go unopposed. The closing session of the conference was, in fact, delayed by two days because of old-guard opposition to two resolutions—one condemning the "rightist" leadership of the Venezuelan Communist Party; and another, even more controversial, criticizing the policy of "certain socialist countries" which gave trade credits and technical assistance to Latin American governments. Rodney Arismendi, the Uruguayan Communist leader, tried to play the mediating role which he had often before assumed, but the only result was that the resolution criticizing Soviet relations with Latin American regimes—passed by 15 votes to 3 (Uruguay, Costa Rica and El Salvador), with 9 absentions (the divided delegations)—was not made public. This made little difference. Castro, who had already criticized Soviet-Latin American relations in his March 13 speech, let the anti-Soviet cat out of the bag in his stormy closing address:

Anything that implies financial and technical aid to any of these countries means repression of the revolutionary movement . . . the least that we can expect from any state in the socialist camp is that it deny [such] aid to any of these governments.[23]

In its intransigent militance, Castro's address—with its bitter denunciation of the "reactionary mafia elements in the revolutionary movement" (*i.e.*, the soft-line, old-guard Communist leadership)—was a fitting conclusion to the proceedings of the conference. The 20-point General Declaration simply ignored and thereby disposed of the doctrinal subtleties advanced by old-guard theorists. Pertinent sections insisted, without qualification, that armed struggle was "the primary path of the revolution in Latin America," to which all other forms of struggle must be subordinated, and that the peoples of "those countries where this is not considered an immediate task" had better "consider it an inevitable prospect."[24] This challenge to the vanguard role of each national Communist party, and to its right to decide its own strategy and tactics, was strengthened by the powers which the OLAS statutes adopted by the conference assigned to the Havana-based (and Cuban-dominated) Permanent Committee:

The Permanent Committee can propose the enlargement or reduction of the national committees. These propositions shall be discussed with the national committee, *whose composition may be changed to find a unanimous solution. If no agreement is reached, the Permanent Committee shall make the decision.*[25]

Old-Guard Reactions

The OLAS conference, then, appeared to mark a further strengthening and institutionalization of Castroism as a regional force. Yet the appearance was somewhat deceptive. In the first place, this new "regional revolutionary international," as some

[23] Radio Havana, Aug. 10, 1967.

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] OLAS Statutes, Chapter 2; emphasis added.

THE CALL TO ARMS

Sign reads: "Don't let the Committees lower their guard, nor the Revolution lose its vigorous momentum." (Caption notes that this is one of many signs located at one-kilometer intervals along the Central Highway in Cuba.)

—From *Con la Guardia en Alto* (Havana), June 1967.

Valla pintada en una pared, junto a la Carretera Central. Otras metálicas, son colocadas cada kilómetro de esta vía.

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observers saw it, was not an international in the old, hierarchically disciplined, Comintern sense. The Cubans might dominate—not control—the Permanent Committee and the Havana missions; they did not dominate, let alone control, the constituent parent organizations in other countries. The alliance between member organizations in individual countries was a precarious and fitful one, and it was questionable how well it would withstand the strains of a prolonged waiting for the Godot of successful revolution. Moreover, Cuban propaganda could not conceal the fact that most of the Jacobin Leftist organizations attending the conference were insignificant fringe groups: the Yugoslav comment that "many delegations consist of quite unknown personalities, representing groups and organizations which have no influence in their countries," was unkind but not unfair.[26]

Moreover, the Cuban challenge to the old-guard Communist leaderships is so far more of ideological than of practical significance. In their resistance to Castroist *Gleichschaltung* these parties have considerable advantages: their organizational strength and habitual discipline; their opportunistic response to local realities; the still persisting disarray of the Jacobin leftists; and, finally, Soviet support. Husbanding these primarily defensive strengths, they try to minimize the disruptive impact of Castroism while keeping their vanguard-role powder dry: their reaction is still predominantly discreet and indirect.

This cautiously defensive stance also characterized their attitudes to the OLAS conference. Before the conference a wave of articles in national and international Communist organs took ideological issue with Castroism—which was never named as such but described as "petty-bourgeois revolutionism" or some similarly transparent periphrasis. After the conference, the Venezuelans vehemently condemned the "divisionist meeting" at which they had been denounced. A PCV Politburo statement described OLAS as "a base anti-Communist and revisionist pseudo-revolutionary group" and expressed confidence that "no Communist party will follow the Cuban leader in his adulteration of principles."[27] The Ecuadorean and Argentine parties explained in marginally polemical terms why they were not attending the meeting, while the Chilean and Costa Rican parties, which had sent delegations, dissociated themselves quietly but firmly from conference documents which, according to Castro's closing speech, had been adopted unanimously.

The Sino-Soviet Factor

Soviet reactions to the new thrust of the Castroist offensive were also expressed cautiously and indirectly. Thus, on August 9, while the conference was going on, a "Radio Peace and Progress" broadcast in Spanish to Latin America quoted approvingly from a report published in the French Communist Party daily, criticizing the "violent anti-Communist and anti-Soviet diatribes of 'ultra-revolutionary' groups" which used "the language customary for some years in Peking."[28]

Even before the OLAS conference, however, the divergence between Cuban and Soviet interests in Latin America was frequently obvious. In general, the Soviet leaders, recognizing the determined strength behind the US presence in the region, are not sanguine about revolutionary struggles. Moreover, the advent of another Communist regime in Latin America would raise serious economic and political problems for the Kremlin: the commitment to defend and subsidize one Cuba is onerous enough. Moscow's preference for political and diplomatic action, aimed at furthering its own and weakening US state interests, is manifest in its attempts to promote relations with Latin American governments condemned by Cuba.[29]

If the Castroist offensive has threatened the interests of the Soviet Union and of the old-guard party leaderships, it has also involved Cuban condemnation of the pro-Chinese secessionists (and of the Trotskyists), who represent an ideological challenge to Castro's regional influence. The results of Chinese intervention in the area have often been exaggerated —partly because Castroist movements are sometimes loosely described as "pro-Chinese." Only in Peru do the secessionists offer any real threat to the official Communist parties; only in Colombia are they taking a subordinate part (with the MOEC) in

[26] Tanjug, Aug. 1, 1967. The failure of the Chilean Socialist leader Salvador Allende to attend the conference was significant.

[27] *Ultimas Noticias* (Caracas), Aug. 20, 1967.

[28] *L'Humanité*, Aug. 4, 1967, quoted by Radio Paz y Progresso (Moscow), Aug. 9. In his closing speech to the conference Castro referred scornfully to this attack by "neo-Social Democrats in Europe."

[29] Two examples have particularly angered the Cubans. In 1966 Moscow signed a $100 million credit agreement which made the right-wing Brazilian regime the leading recipient of Soviet aid in Latin America after Cuba; and early in 1967 it signed an agreement for $57 million worth of credit and technical aid to the reformist Chilean regime.

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a guerrilla struggle. Chinese intervention, such as it is, has been aimed not at promoting anti-imperialist struggles but at gaining peripheral ground in the Sino-Soviet conflict—and Castro is bent upon proving the irrelevance of that struggle for the Latin American revolution.

The New Ideology

At the same time, Castro has still to prove the relevance of Castroism for Latin America. On one level, as we have seen, this means an effort at institutionalization, exerted mainly through the OLAS, the OCLAE and other Havana-based regional organizations. On another level it means developing some ideological superstructure on the foundation of revolutionary voluntarism. Part of this work of ideological elaboration has been done by a new school of young Castroist "ideologues" at the University of Havana, whose vigorous critiques of sanctioned dogmas, and particularly of Soviet textbooks, have enlivened a publication with the characteristically iconoclastic title of *El Caimàn Barbudo* (The Bearded Alligator). However, Castroism has found its most impressive intellectual exponent not in a Cuban but in the young French scholar, Régis Debray—whose capture, trial and imprisonment for guerrilla activity in Bolivia have made world headlines in recent months, especially in connection with the death of Che Guevara.

Debray had abandoned a brilliant academic career to spend 1966 in Cuba—having already, at 26, visited the island several times, toured extensively in Latin America, and written with insight and enthusiasm about the continental revolution. Prolonged discussions with Castro and other Cuban leaders, and access to many unpublished documents, gave him an unrivalled background for his short book, *Revolución en la Revolución?* [Revolution Within the Revolution?].[30] Published in Havana early in 1967, it was at once publicized by the Cuban press and radio: here were the lessons of the Cuban revolution for Latin America, analyzed with sophistication and enthusiasm—and expounded, most usefully, by a European outsider.

Debray summed up his primary thesis in a *Granma* interview (English edition, Feb. 5, 1967): "The Latin Americans have a gold mine in their neighborhood, and they were looking for paper currency elsewhere." By "paper currency" he meant the entire range of the revolutionary theory and practice of the Russians, the Chinese and the Vietnamese. In his book he dismissed the bulk of Communist strategic doctrine as being obviously inapplicable to Latin America. Like his Cuban sponsors, he argued that the primary task on the Latin American continent is "the development of guerrilla warfare and not . . . the strengthening of existing parties or the creation of new parties."[31] More precisely, the guerrilla force must develop its own, independent politico-military authority:

Fidel Castro says simply that there is no revolution without a vanguard; that this vanguard is not necessarily the Marxist-Leninist party; and that those who want to make the revolution have the right and the duty to constitute themselves a vanguard, independently of these parties.[32]

Here we have an essentially pragmatic, functional approach to the specific problems of the Latin American revolution. Revolutionary action—through rural guerrilla struggles, as a general rule—is the test. It is a test open to all leftist groups that choose to undertake it, with no privileged position for the established Communist parties. Indeed, in this perspective these parties would be, at best, eventually absorbed; for out of the single politico-military leadership demanded by guerrilla warfare is to grow the future ruling party of the socialist revolution—*if* the Cuban success can be repeated.

Failures and Setbacks

But there, precisely, is the rub. The last and most important level on which Castroism has yet to prove itself is that of practice. So far, it has produced more rhetoric than results. Apart from the small-scale, sporadic outbursts that have from time to time erupted in various countries in Central America and elsewhere—and have been quickly suppressed—serious guerrilla campaigns have developed in Guatemala, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia

[30] An English translation by Bobbye Ortiz from the author's French and Spanish, under the title *Revolution in the Revolution?*, has been issued as a special number of *Monthly Review* (New York), July-August 1967. References are to this version.

[31] *Revolution in the Revolution?*, p. 116.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 98. Debray's book contains a critique of previous revolutionary practice, including the concepts of "armed self-defense" (upheld by the Colombian Communists), of "spontaneism" (the Trotskyist hopes of arousing the masses), of heterogeneous "national fronts" (as advocated by the old-guard Communist leaderships) and of "armed propaganda" (as practiced by the Chinese and Vietnamese).

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and Bolivia. Peru has been a great disappointment to Castro: the guerrilla struggle launched in 1965 by the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) was virtually crushed within six months. In three of the other four countries, campaigns which the Cubans hailed with a fanfare of extravagant predictions have made no headway or have been reduced to marginal proportions—as in Guatemala, for example, where of late the main result of the diminished campaigns of the Communist-controlled Rebel Armed Forces and the rival November 13 Movement has been to provoke a deplorable wave of right-wing counter-terrorism.

The greatest setback, however, has occurred in Bolivia; and it has involved not only Debray, the French evangelist of Castroism, but also the movement's most prominent figure after Fidel himself—Che Guevara.

Following Guevara's mysterious disappearance from the Cuban scene in 1965, Castro indicated that his former lieutenant had gone to serve the revolutionary cause in other lands. Yet speculation based on known or assumed differences between the two persisted, and his whereabouts—not to mention his standing with Castro—were a subject of much debate. The first solid indication of Guevara's current preoccupations came when the Cubans, with much fanfare, published a manifesto in his name in April 1967, called "Message to the Peoples of the World through the Tricontinental." [33]

[33] *Granma Weekly Review*, April 23, 1967.

TO OUR READERS:

We regret the unusual delay in the appearance of the last and current issues of *Problems of Communism*. We shall be back on schedule with the next (March-April) issue. Among forthcoming articles:

The Cultural Revolution—A Balance Sheet:
Economics—*Jan Prybyla*
Social Stratification—*Victor C. Funnell*
The Soviet Perspective—*David E. Powell and Richard C. Thornton*
Reforms in Yugoslavia—*A. Z. Rubinstein*
Communism in Ceylon—*J. van der Kroef*

In its militant emphasis on the need to wage armed struggle against the imperialists in as many countries as possible, Guevara's manifesto was reminiscent of Chinese teachings on "people's war." But whereas the Chinese stressed the necessity of ideologically-motivated struggle, rejecting any prospect of collaboration with the "revisionists," Guevara condemned such dogmatism. Taking up a theme which Castro had sounded more discreetly on occasion, he denounced both the USSR and China (clearly, though not by name) for having kept up their "war of abuse and maneuvering," instead of moving together to "make Vietnam an inviolable part of the socialist world, running, of course, the risk of war on a global scale—but also forcing a decision upon imperialism." In view of this shared "guilt," and the fact that a Sino-Soviet reconciliation appeared "extremely difficult, if not impossible," the guerrilla fighters of the Third World—"we, the dispossessed"—could not take either side; their task, rather, was to confront imperialism with "two, three or many Vietnams."

While the Cubans were publicizing his manifesto, Guevara—as became clear subsequently—was engaged in precisely the task of trying to create "another Vietnam" in the inhospitable terrain of southeast Bolivia. The force of perhaps 100 men which Guevara assembled for this purpose, and which was pushed into premature action by a chance encounter with Bolivian troops in late March 1967, represented something new. First, it was strikingly international in composition.[34] Secondly, although Communist (both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese), Castroist and Trotskyist parties in Bolivia hailed the guerrilla struggle, none was able to claim leadership or even partial control of it.[35] Again the area of struggle had been chosen by a shrewd strategist—inaccessible and thinly populated so that, given moderate luck, there would be time for careful preparation; but conveniently near the borders of Paraguay and Argentina, and not too far from the tin-mining centers with their own tradition of proletarian rebellion. For several months the guerrillas, well-armed and disciplined, inflicted a series of humiliating defeats on Army detachments. But the tide turned—in part because the guerrillas failed to win the support of the Indian peasants. By September, troops were closing in on harried and divided rem-

[34] A Bolivian Army communiqué of June 11, 1967, claimed that the force was known to include at least 17 Cubans, 14 Brazilians, 4 Argentinians and 3 Peruvians.

[35] See Carlos María Gutierrez, "Bolivia: Otra forma de guerrilla," *Política* (Mexico City), May 15-31, 1967.

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nants of the force. On October 8 the leader identified by fingerprints as Guevara was captured, and died next day, having apparently been shot after capture.[36]

In a speech on October 15, and again at a memorial rally on October 18, Castro acknowledged that Guevara had been leading the Bolivian struggle, and that he had been killed. Calling this "a tremendous blow for revolutionary movements" in Latin America, the Cuban leader suggested that the defeat might have been the result of Guevara's having "acted in an excessively aggressive manner." [37] By subtly attributing the Bolivian setback to his old comrade's impetuous militance, he thus reasserted his own charismatic leadership, while at the same time laying Castroist claim to the exemplary legend of Guevara, the dedicated revolutionary.

But the failure of the Bolivian venture has other roots and is of wider significance: it points to the unlikelihood of either "another Cuba" or "other Vietnams" in the foreseeable future. Castro's capacity to exploit anti-Yanqui nationalism and the forces released by the travail of social and economic modernization is considerable, but it is limited. For one thing, while the fact that Cuba is an island has helped Castro to maintain his regime, it is also the main obstacle to the fulfilment of his grandiose continental dreams. The flood of angry young men pouring into Cuba for "training" in the early 1960's has diminished to an unimpressive trickle. As a further consequence of this isolation, the aid that Cuba can give to foreign revolutionary movements must mainly take the form of inspiration, advice and propaganda: the direct intervention which has occurred in Venezuela and Bolivia is the exception. Meanwhile, the Castroist offensive serves to heighten Latin American governments' distrust of Cuba and their vigilance against subversion.

One observer has remarked that "the effect of Cuba on the hemisphere has been like the salt in a stew: little has really been added, but all the tastes have been accented." [38] The metaphor is apt and perceptive. However, something new *has* been added to the Latin American Left—a revolutionary movement of a new type which directly challenges the old, and which contributes, out of proportion to its power base, to the ideological erosion and polycentric transformation of international communism.

[36] The report of Guevara's death may still be questioned, because of the Bolivian authorities' action in cremating the body; but the weight of evidence, including the Cuban reaction, leaves little room for doubt.

[37] Radio Havana, Oct. 18, 1967; *New York Times*, Oct. 20.

[38] Kalman H. Silvert, "A Hemispheric Perspective," in John Plank, ed., *Cuba and the United States: Long-Range Perspectives*, Washington, DC, 1967, p. 136.

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Shanghai: The Masses Unleashed

By Evelyn Anderson

In January 1967, Shanghai became the first Chinese city where the Maoists claimed to have scored a decisive triumph over their foes in China's protracted Cultural Revolution. In the authorized version, this celebrated "January revolution" has ever since been described as the grand climax of a struggle in which the Maoist revolutionaries finally wrested control from the "bourgeois power-holders" in the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The known facts, however, suggest a different interpretation. The official version is at best a half-truth designed to veil some of the most important aspects of the actual course of events. Most of the facts have only belatedly come to light in the form of piecemeal retrospective accounts provided by official Chinese sources as incidental illustrations of specific denunciations or propaganda appeals. Even today many pieces of the jigsaw puzzle are still missing, but enough has emerged to provide the main outlines of the real picture. What is more, the piecing together of the scattered accounts of events in Shanghai just before, during and after the January revolution furnishes important clues to the broader phenomenon of "economism" which, in early 1967, threatened to undermine the Cultural Revolution all over the Chinese mainland.

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1966, Shanghai had followed Peking's lead in staging mammoth rallies in support of the Cultural Revolution and in filling its two main newspapers, *Wen Hui Pao* and the municipal party organ *Chieh-fang Jih-pao*, with bitter attacks on alleged "rightist" intellectuals. Nevertheless, it may well be true, as the Maoist rebels later suggested,[1] that the Shanghai

A British student of Communist affairs, Mrs. Anderson has written extensively on developments in several Communist countries and on inter-Communist relations, in Survey *(London) and elsewhere.*

[1] New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA), Jan. 20, 1967.

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party leaders were less than enthusiastic about the new twist given to the Cultural Revolution by the CCP Central Committee's circular of May 16, 1966,[2] with its barely veiled call for a nationwide purge. Trouble finally broke out early in September following the arrival in Shanghai of successive batches of Red Guards from Peking and other parts of China. Open clashes occurred between the Peking Red Guards and numerous local Red Guard organizations which had sprung into being in the port city, and there also were frequent conflicts between Red Guard students and industrial workers, as well as between Peking Red Guards and local party officials. Almost immediately after their arrival late in August, the first wave of Red Guards from Peking denounced Shanghai Mayor Tsao Ti-chiu and members of the Municipal Party Committee as "black anti-Maoists," and on at least one occasion they stormed the local party headquarters.[3] According to foreign eye-witness accounts, the assailants smashed windows and furniture and attacked party officials with sticks and army belts, leaving many injured behind.

Towards the middle of September, Red Guards began a virtual take-over of the city. By then Shanghai's own Red Guard organizations had been reinforced by more than a million outside Red Guards, who were quartered in over 1,500 reception centers and catered to by some 150,000 full-time reception workers.[4] Acting jointly or, more often, in competition with one another, they commandeered all municipal transport, occupied public buildings and, in the Peking manner, thronged the city's squares, streets and alleys, attacking all manner of real or imaginary opponents and calling for bigger and better rebellion. The turmoil they produced made life difficult enough for the city's population, but worse was still to come.

The Workers' Revolt

The really serious challenge in Shanghai came in December and January, when the city's industrial, harbor and railway workers, mainly under the leadership of locally-organized "Workers' Red Militia Detachments" and with the support of returned labor conscripts from faraway construction sites, responded in their own way to the incessant calls to rebel. In contrast to the wishes of the organizers of the Cultural Revolution, this workers' rebellion was directed, not against counterrevolutionary revisionism or other anti-Maoist heresies, but against the harsh living and working conditions of the workers' own everyday existence. Their acts of defiance took many different forms and were geared to a variety of specific issues, but they had one common characteristic: namely, that they were all inspired first and foremost—and in most cases exclusively —by eminently practical social and economic grievances.

There can be little doubt that the seemingly unlimited license which the Red Guard students enjoyed, and the airs they gave themselves as Mao's little commissars, aroused deep resentment and envy among the rest of the population and played a considerable part in encouraging the industrial workers to advance their own demands for economic betterment. The workers' claims, it is true, were almost invariably wrapped in appropriate Maoist phrases, but in substance they amounted to imperative and increasingly menacing demands for an immediate reduction in working hours, improved wage scales, subsidiary wage and welfare payments, housing schemes, and total abolition of the "unreasonable" and onerous conditions under which various special categories of workers, notably Shanghai's multitude of temporary and contract workers, were employed.

By mid-December of 1966, the city authorities had apparently lost control of the situation. Swamped on all sides by denunciations and calls for rebellion, they were, it seems, incapable of holding out any longer against the mounting working-class pressures for social reform. Verbally or in writing, they gave some groups of workers hasty promises of redress, while they provided others with railway passes and considerable sums of cash for the express purpose of going to Peking "to complain about conditions." But while some of the workers' demands were thus met, a great many others were not, or not quickly enough. By now bitterly resentful and aroused, the workers of Shanghai were in no mood to make do with less than they had been demanding. They sought to enforce their demands by means of protest strikes which gathered momentum so quickly that by the turn of the year they threatened to assume the proportions of a general strike.

Strike action apparently began in the port of Shanghai shortly before Christmas 1966. According to one official account, this "extremely serious harbor strike" was the sequel to protests against "unreasonable" working conditions which induced

[2] NCNA, May 16, 1967.
[3] *Wen Hui Pao* (Shanghai), Feb. 4, 1967.
[4] Shanghai Radio, March 7, 1967.

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"large numbers of workers to leave their production posts."[5] Shortly afterwards, work on the railways came to a halt. The two main lines linking Shanghai with Nanking and Hangchow were completely paralyzed as all traffic stopped moving from the Shanghai terminal and strikers brought scores of passenger and freight trains to a halt at interim points on both lines.[6] Strikes also played havoc with Shanghai's inland and waterway transport, on which the city depends for its coal, iron, industrial raw materials, and certain agricultural products.[7] The snowballing effects of the total paralysis of transport and communications facilities were in themselves enough to threaten the survival of so populous an industrial city and port as Shanghai. Electricity and even water supplies were interrupted,[8] while many of the most important factories as well as numerous smaller industrial and commercial enterprises had to shut down either because they, too, were strike-bound or because they had run out of materials or fuel and power.

Three additional factors aggravated the situation even further. First, the city treasury, banks and enterprises were running out of funds. The subsidiary wage and welfare benefits which had been hastily paid out to appease the workers, the large sums of money advanced to workers and Red Guard students travelling to other places, and the probably even larger sums spent on the paraphernalia of propaganda and the reception of visitors from outside the city had imposed a severe drain on local financial resources,[9] further compounded by a general run on the banks.

Secondly, the surrounding rural areas which normally supply Shanghai with vegetables and other agricultural products were just then less and less able, or willing, to do so. Large numbers of peasants had deserted their fields and trekked into the city to "make rebellion" or to complain about their own living conditions, and those who remained behind began distributing among themselves produce that should have been sent to urban markets. Moreover, the constant rectification campaigns and Red Guard rampages served to hamper and disrupt production in the countryside as well as in the cities.[10]

Thirdly, Shanghai's normal population of some ten million had been greatly swelled by the influx of over a million Red Guards from other areas, of large numbers of peasants from the rural outskirts, and of even larger numbers of former Shanghai citizens who had seized upon the Cultural Revolution as an excuse to return from Sinkiang and other remote areas where they had previously been sent to work on construction sites or in agriculture. Housing and feeding all these newcomers had caused serious shortages even before the outbreak of the December-January strikes, and as a direct or indirect result of the work stoppages, these shortages now became critical. Angry and anxious citizens besieged shops and markets in search of scarce supplies, and there was a run of panic-buying from black marketeers, often with the aid of funds forcibly expropriated from banks.

The "January Revolution"

Such, then, were the chaotic conditions which produced "the great storm of Shanghai's January revolution." The eleven "revolutionary rebel organizations" which joined forces early in January, under the leadership of the Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters, to take charge of the city's affairs did so in a situation in which public order was in shambles, all chains of command had broken down, and the Municipal CCP Committee and top local administrators had to all intents and purposes ceased to exercise any sort of authority. Far from winning a glorious victory over "bourgeois" or any other kind of power-holders, the revolutionary rebels stepped in to fill a vacuum. Their "revolution"—at least in its initial stage—had no direct connection with the power struggle between Mao and his factional adversaries. It was in fact an emergency operation—the desperate, last-minute bid of a very small but determined minority to restore order and discipline in a city threatened by economic paralysis.

The rebel groups began by seizing control of the principal local communications media, taking over the newspaper *Wen Hui Pao* on January 4, the local party organ *Chieh-fang Jih-pao* on January 6 (after bloody struggles), and the Shanghai radio and television stations on January 17. Their first act after the seizure of *Wen Hui Pao* was the publication on January 5 of a "Message to the People of Shanghai," followed three days later by an initial "Urgent Notice" appealing for the restoration of order. Both initiatives were immediately acclaimed by the CCP Central Committee as models to be followed throughout China.

[5] Shanghai Radio, Jan. 10, 1967; Peking Radio, Jan. 16, 1967.
[6] NCNA, Feb. 9, 1967.
[7] Shanghai Radio, Jan. 13, 1967.
[8] NCNA, Jan. 16, 1967.
[9] NCNA, Jan. 19, 1967.
[10] Shanghai Radio, Jan. 14, 1967.

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An illustration of the sort of thing the revolutionary rebels had to contend with was provided by Radio Shanghai, then not yet taken over, on the very day the rebels' message to the local population was published. Radio Shanghai reported:

At a rally in People's Square, hundreds of thousands of temporary and contract workers today pledged themselves to smash the unreasonable system under which they are employed, and to set up a new labor system in line with Mao Tse-tung's thinking. The system of hiring temporary and outside workers is a remnant of the labor system of capitalism. For the past seventeen years a handful in authority within the party has been clinging to this system. . . . At the rally many representatives of the temporary and contract workers indignantly protested against the crimes resulting from this unreasonable labor system.

But the authors of the "Message to the People of Shanghai" and of the subsequent "Urgent Notice" had quite different ends in view. Their principal target of attack was "economism," and their first priority, as both pronouncements made plain, was the restoration of the city's disrupted transport and public utility services and the resumption of factory production. In practice this meant an all-out attempt at strike-breaking. Thus, in launching their bid for control of Shanghai, the "revolutionary rebels" were struggling in the first instance not against the so-called "handful in power in the party committee taking the capitalist road," but against their striking fellow-workers and, in particular, against the strike organizers in the Workers' Red Militia Detachments.

Their task was complicated by the fact that they could not afford to say plainly what they were doing and aiming at. So they fell back on the device, soon imitated elsewhere in China, of blaming the "handful" for everything that had gone wrong or might go wrong in the future. The handful, it was charged, had first attempted to suppress the Cultural Revolution. Then they had incited workers and students to fight one another. Next they had encouraged workers to be carried away by "the black wind of economism," to make "wholly unreasonable" wage and welfare demands, and finally "to leave their production posts" in order to sabotage production, paralyze the transportation and communications system, and cut off the supply of water and electricity.[11] The handful were afterwards held equally responsible for all other troubles—for the shortage of food and consumer goods, the many acts of robbery and violence, the forcible occupation of public buildings, the numerous assaults on the public security services, the misdeeds of speculators and black marketeers, and the subsequent turn of the "evil wind of economism" to the rural areas.

Meaning of the Revolt

Some outside observers of the China scene accepted these official explanations more or less at face value. They argued that Mao's enemies were deliberately attempting to produce maximum disorder so as to defeat him and stop the Cultural Revolution. These arguments would perhaps be more convincing if the evils attributed to the "bourgeois power-holders" had not continued after their overthrow. It cannot, of course, be excluded that some of Mao's most determined opponents may have relied, or may still be relying, on the spread of chaos as a means of bringing him to his senses or of defeating and ousting him. But it is difficult to believe that they had the power and the contacts to act in concert so as to produce chaos on the scale that it actually reached, not just in Shanghai but in other parts of China as well. Whether they hoped to exploit it or not, all the evidence suggests that "the evil wind of counterrevolutionary economism" was a truly spontaneous mass movement by workers, and later also by peasants, for more tolerable living and working conditions. In December and January, in the words of a Shanghai newspaper, the movement "swept over the whole city and quickly spread to the rural areas with temporary crushing success.[12]

Although these developments were certainly not —and perhaps could not have been—anticipated, there was in itself nothing improbable about the sudden eruption of a quasi-syndicalist movement of this kind. If such eruptions are extremely rare in Communist-ruled states, this is solely because their party regimes have as a rule maintained effective totalitarian control. In China, it was precisely the assault on established party authorities, launched in the name of the Cultural Revolution, which led in Shanghai and elsewhere to the breakdown of the system of party rule and thereby opened the floodgates to unforeseen and undesired spontaneous popular movements. It is revealing that the Maoists chose the term "economism" to denounce this powerful "adverse current." Ever since Lenin's early polemics against the heresy of "economism" in Russian Social Democracy, the term has been used

[11] *Wen Hui Pao*, Jan. 5, 1967.

[12] *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1967.

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in Communist parlance to describe those trade-unionist movements which spring spontaneously from the working class in response to its living and working conditions, and which exhaust themselves in struggles for immediate social and economic improvements instead of advancing the cause of revolution. Certainly, all that was said in China during 1967 about and against "economism" [13] sounded like typically Maoist elaborations of Lenin's dictum (in *What is to be Done?*) that "a trade-union policy of the working class is simply a bourgeois policy for the working class."

The Hydra of "Economism"

Shanghai's "January revolution" marked the first attempt by pro-Maoist forces in China to put an end to such "bourgeois" trade-unionist workers' movements and to the "guild mentality" which inspired them.[14] This was undoubtedly the principal significance of the Shanghai events in the eyes of Mao, who saw his Cultural Revolution threatening to founder on the unforeseen rock of "economism." As *Jen-min Jih-pao* admitted at the time, economism had become the key problem of the Cultural Revolution, not only for Shanghai but for the entire nation.[15]

The leaders of the January revolution in Shanghai found themselves facing an uphill task. It was one thing to denounce strikes and other symptoms of economism, but quite another to end them effectively. On January 10, five days after the rebel take-over, *Wen Hui Pao* published a fresh warning against "the resurgence of the tidal wave of economism." On the same day members of a "revolutionary rebel group" in Shanghai harbor pledged themselves to replace striking workers and to persist in work "even if there is only one single person left." [16] Students and People's Liberation Army soldiers helped out as strikebreakers,[17] but even so it was not until January 23 that Shanghai Radio was able to report that most ships in the harbor had once more begun to move, and that the amount of cargo unloaded per day was "almost the same as during normal operations." The railway strike was brought to an end towards the middle of January, again largely thanks to the intervention of students and PLA units acting as strikebreakers.[18] Tugboats and barges on Shanghai's inland waterways were reported to have resumed sailing on January 10, although Shanghai Radio acknowledged three days later that half the boats were still lying idle. In most factories, too, work was resumed in the second half of January. The city's unparalleled strike wave was thus eventually broken, but "economism" proved to be a kind of hydra which grew new heads as soon as one was cut off.

From the middle of January onwards, the revolutionary rebels in Shanghai displayed increasing concern about the harmful effects of economism on the rural communes on the city's outskirts. In the name of "practicing extensive democracy," commune members had acted in various ways to secure a better deal for themselves. They had increased their own shares in the annual year-end distribution of commune produce at the expense of the city markets. They had distributed production capital and reserves and had then requested bank loans, threatening to "rebel" in the event of refusal. Many had left the communes altogether and gone into the city, causing a decrease in agricultural output and a simultaneous increase in urban demand for farm products. They demanded that their income and living conditions be raised to the same levels as those of urban workers and frequently took the initiative in fights with workers, students and competing rebel groups.[19] With the approach of the spring farming season, the situation became even more urgent. In the end, it could be retrieved—as in the city itself—only with the help of the PLA, which from mid-February onward was put in command of spring ploughing and other agricultural work.

Changing of the Guard

The actual seizure of power in the January revolution came only in February, when the Maoist rebels formally deprived the old municipal officials of their authority. They did this following the solemn proclamation, on February 5, of the Shanghai People's Commune under a Provisional Committee headed by two committed Maoists. One of

[13] See "The Economism of China's Khrushchev," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Sept. 14, 1967; and "Leader of the Workers' Movement or No. 1 Scab?," *ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1967.
[14] *Wen Hui Pao*, March 11, 1967.
[15] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Jan. 9, 1967.
[16] Shanghai Radio, Jan. 10, 1967.
[17] Peking Radio, Jan. 16, 1967; Shanghai Radio, July 28, 1967.
[18] *Wen Hui Pao*, Feb. 4, 1967; Shanghai Radio, Feb. 21, 1967.
[19] Shanghai Radio, Jan. 14, 1967; *Wen Hui Pao* and *Chieh-fang Jih-pao*, Jan. 20 and 27, 1967.

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these was Chang Chun-chiao, a former secretary of the Shanghai Municipal CCP Committee, who had sided with Mao since 1965 and had subsequently become a Deputy Leader of the Cultural Revolution Group under the CCP Central Committee. His second in command was Yao Wen-yuan, the young intellectual whom Mao had picked in the autumn of 1965 to fire the opening shot in the Cultural Revolution.[20] Yao, too, had subsequently been elevated to the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group.

Local editorials celebrated the birth of the Shanghai People's Commune as "an event of unparalleled historical significance" and a product of "the creative application of Mao Tse-tung's thought."[21] But Mao himself seems to have had some reservations regarding the action of his Shanghai supporters. The central press studiously ignored the creation of the Commune, and the new Shanghai leadership, on instructions from the Central Committee, was obliged to content itself with the rather more modest and formally less independent status of a Municipal Revolutionary Committee.

With the establishment of this Committee on February 23, the Maoist power seizure in Shanghai was, on the face of it, complete. But while the "rebel" leaders succeeded in occupying the empty chairs of the former powerholders with comparative ease, they found it rather more difficult to establish effective authority over a local populace whose views on the objectives of rebellion more often than not clashed with their own. The old troubles either persisted or reappeared after an interval, and new problems came to the fore. Among the latter was the increasingly serious problem of unemployment.

The Unemployed

Many of the unemployed were people who had poured into Shanghai from outside since the early autumn of 1966. They included large numbers of Shanghai natives who had been assigned several years earlier to agricultural work in difficult mountainous regions or to frontier construction projects. Unlike the Red Guards from Peking and other cities, these Shanghai "expatriates"—both workers and students—refused to move out again. Especially those with families in the city responded neither to public appeals to return to their assignments nor to charges that they were acting on the instigation of the counterrevolutionary handful in "unreasonably" demanding the right to stay in Shanghai and resume their former jobs there. The returned exiles formed their own "rebel" organizations and continued to defy the new Maoist authorities. On February 24, when the short-lived People's Commune changed its name at Peking's bidding to Shanghai Revolutionary Municipal Committee, one expatriate rebel group which had set up headquarters in the Shanghai Mansions staged an assault on the Revolutionary Committee's economic department, officially known as "The Grasp Revolution and Stimulate Production Work Team." According to a detailed report subsequently broadcast by Shanghai Radio, members of this rebel group

. . . detained and assaulted 28 members of "The Grasp Revolution and Stimulate Production Work Team" of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee. After this incident they continued to deploy large numbers around the Shanghai Mansions day and night, beating up public security personnel, stirring up fights, and calling in large numbers of their counterparts from Kiangsu, Anhwei and other provinces to undermine the task of grasping revolution and stimulating production. . . . *They have openly attacked and resisted the Urgent Notice, slandering it as harmful to the workers,* and have denied the great achievements of the past 17 years by saying that *the living conditions of the workers are now as poor as they were under the Kuomintang before liberation. . . .*[22]

Even more remarkable than the frankness of this account was the lame and patently helpless appeal with which it ended:

We warn you. You have gone too far. If you don't stop at the verge of the precipice, you will be sorry in the end.

No further grave incidents of this kind were reported, but neither, it seems, did the returned expatriates go back to their outside assignments. Appeals to them to do so were repeated month after month right into the summer.[23]

There were serious troubles, too, with legitimate Shanghai residents who had apparently been thrown

[20] This was Yao's article attacking Wu Han, published in Shanghai in November 1965. According to *Hung Ch'i* (No. 9, 1967), Yao wrote the article on Mao's personal initiative and under the direct supervision of Mao's wife, Chiang Ching. Yao was also the author of the subsequent attack on the "Three Family Village," published in Shanghai in May 1966, which was the final curtain-raiser for the public ouster of Peking First Party Secretary P'eng Chen.

[21] *Wen Hui Pao,* Feb. 6 and 8, 1967.

[22] Shanghai Radio, Feb. 28, 1967.

[23] *Wen Hui Pao,* June 21, 1967; *Chieh-fang Jih-pao,* July 12, 1967; Shanghai Radio, Aug. 6, 1967.

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out of work as a consequence of reduced economic activity. Soon after the proclamation of the People's Commune, *Wen Hui Pao*, in an article complaining of frequent attacks on low-level party cadres in the city's alleys and backstreets, accused some people of struggling against the cadres for purely selfish and unreasonable economic goals such as a demand for the immediate provision of jobs—conduct which the paper denounced as a manifestation of counterrevolutionary economism.[24] The unemployed workers, too, had set up their own "rebel headquarters" in the city, and on February 20 it organized a rally at which it was resolved that laid-off workers should remain at their former places of employment in order to help in the Cultural Revolution and assure the overfulfillment of output quotas. A "special notice" issued a week later by the Municipal Revolutionary Committee, however, annulled this resolution as incompatible with the maintenance of work discipline, ordered the unwanted workers to evacuate their former units "immediately, unconditionally and completely," and admonished them to rid their minds of "egotistic ideas" and "practice self-restraint." [25] Subsequent reports failed to indicate to what extent these exhortations were heeded.

Obstacles to Pacification

But the hardest task facing the new ruling committee remained the restoration of general public order and the reestablishment of a viable administration. One complicating factor was the confusing proliferation of warring and defiantly insubordinate rebel organizations; another and even more serious obstacle was the difficulty of finding cadres with administrative experience, organizing ability, and political reliability to restaff the purge-ridden local party and government apparatus. These were nationwide problems, but the size and economic importance of Shanghai rendered them particularly acute and complex in the big port city.

For some months following the Maoist takeover, hardly a day passed in Shanghai without a press editorial, a radio appeal, or an "Urgent Notice" dealing with one or both of these problems. There were repeated calls for a "great alliance"—*i.e.*, of competing rebel organizations—but they failed to overcome what the new administration denounced as "small group mentality," "mountain stronghold mentality," "factionalism," "sectarianism," "extreme democracy," "anarchism," and "unprincipled civil wars." The plain fact behind these charges was that the leaders of the multitude of Red Guard and rebel groups were loath to surrender the power and glory they had snatched from the Cultural Revolution. They were, as *Wen Hui Pao* put it, "unenthusiastic about the alliance for fear of becoming commanders without troops," and "some comrades seize every chance to assert independence. . . . They are ready to achieve a great alliance only if their particular group forms the center and they themselves become the number one or two." [26]

Efforts to unite the Maoist rebels were also complicated by the genuine difficulty of distinguishing between authentic Maoists and those who merely mouthed Maoist phrases out of fear or as deliberate camouflage. But probably the greatest obstacle to cooperation was the deep gulf which continued to separate all those who had taken an active part in the great strike wave and other forms of social protest, on the one hand, and their Maoist opponents who had defeated them with the aid of strikebreakers from the universities and the army, on the other. The persistence of this problem was underlined by a *Wen Hui Pao* editorial of May 3, 1967, which deplored the occurrence of new outbreaks of violence between workers and Maoists:

It is wrong for some comrades to regard all workers as conservatives and to fight "civil wars" against them. We must be aware that, except for a few diehards, most of the workers misled by the conservative groups are our class brothers. It is therefore detrimental to the great revolutionary alliance once again to concentrate our strength on fighting "civil wars" against the conservatives.

Notable among the "conservatives" were the Workers' Red Militia Detachments which appear to have been the chief organizers of the December-January strikes, and which remained unrepentant opponents of the Maoist "revolutionary rebels" after the latter's take-over. Despite published claims that people who had been duped into joining the Workers' Detachments were beginning to realize their mistakes and to shift their allegiance to the new Maoist regime, the press also kept on repeating that the revolutionary leftists must go on trying to win over the masses within the Detachments and other "conservative" organizations. Then, in May, Shanghai information media publicized "investigation ma-

[24] *Wen Hui Pao*, Feb. 9, 1967.
[25] Shanghai Radio, March 2, 1967.
[26] *Wen Hui Pao*, March 18 and May 7, 1967.

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terial" purporting to show that the Workers' Red Militia Detachments had been merely a tool of the capitalist-leaning "handful in authority," who had allegedly used them "to cut off water and power supply and hold up transportation." [27] Editorials once again pleaded that a distinction must be made between the ringleaders and the hoodwinked members of the Workers' Detachments.

If a "great alliance" uniting the host of competing revolutionary organizations thus failed to materialize, Maoist hopes for a "three-way alliance" joining Maoist rebel groups, the PLA, and former party cadres of demonstrated revolutionary character proved even more difficult to achieve. The wholesale denunciation, humiliation and, frequently, physical maltreatment of practically all party and local government cadres at the height of the Red Guard rampages had clearly been too traumatic an experience for the antagonisms and fears thus generated to be dispelled by mere appeals for reconciliation. Yet, for the new ruling Municipal Committee, reconciliation between the cadres and their assailants had become an objective second in importance only to the eradication of economism. The great majority of former cadres now had to be rehabilitated and reinstated not only because the latest directives from Peking said so, but because the new Shanghai Committee found it impossible to reestablish any kind of order and authority without their active support. The Maoist rebels were desperately short of politically experienced and capable organizers and administrators. Without such people, they admitted candidly, public security could not be safeguarded and the "power-seizures" they had carried out in various local organs could not last.[28]

But the obstacles to genuine reconciliation and the dilemmas arising from its very pursuit seemed almost insuperable. True, many of the ordinary, low-level cadres were eventually reinstated after having to go through an appropriate ritual of confessions and repudiations of error, but in view of the purely ceremonial and often farcical make-believe involved in such confessions and reinstatements, and the profound disillusionment and cynicism to which they gave rise,[29] it is probable that few, if any, of those reinstated were genuine converts. In the case of former leading cadres, who were the most urgently needed but who had also suffered most under denunciations and persecutions, reconciliation—real or pretended—was much more difficult to achieve. With a very few triumphantly publicized exceptions, most of them failed to heed the incessant appeals to step forward and once again resume leadership. They were probably either too resentful or understandably afraid of fresh outbursts of hostility and of being again stigmatized as anti-Maoists. Such resentment and fears were reinforced by the defiant refusal of many Red Guard and rebel groups to have any truck with the old leading cadres.

Exercises in Futility

The situation was rendered no less difficult by the fact that the new Revolutionary Committee, in its anxiety to avoid offending against any and all aspects of shifting Maoist policy, often seemed to be moving in opposite directions at the same time. Thus, on the one hand, it admonished the patently reluctant rebels and Red Guards to accept the rehabilitation of former leading cadres (excepting only the very small counterrevolutionary handful); on the other, it enjoined them to combine the establishment of "three-way alliances" in all basic units with continuing purges of remaining hidden agents of the "Khrushchev of China." [30] Similarly, former leading cadres were urged to stop feeling aggrieved and to hurry forward to resume official tasks, but at the same time they were told that they would first have to make public confessions of their errors, and that they would not be permitted to plead that they had no errors to confess, much less to blame their persecutors in the Red Guards and rebel groups for the harsh treatment they had undergone. Nevertheless, they were told that they were urgently needed and would be warmly welcomed if they repented, no matter how late they joined the revolutionary rebels.[31]

As these somewhat ambivalent appeals had predictably little effect toward producing a reconciliation, the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee eagerly seized upon new directives from Peking ordering a concerted effort to focus all anger and discontent on a single target: the "Khrushchev of China" (Chairman of the Republic Liu Shao-ch'i) and his handful of agents in the country at large. Apart

[27] Shanghai Radio, May 15, 1967.
[28] *Wen Hui Pao*, Feb. 25, 1967.
[29] For first-hand testimony on this point, see Neale Hunter, "Three Cadres of Shanghai," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. LVI, No. 9.
[30] *Chieh-fang Jih-pao*, April 18, 1967.
[31] *Ibid.*, March 16, 1967; *Wen Hui Pao*, May 5 and 9, 1967.

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from its avowed central purpose, this campaign also seems to have been designed to help toward ending the continuing "unprincipled civil wars" and reestablishing a modicum of unity by means of joint attacks on a common enemy. In Shanghai the campaign assumed vast proportions. From the beginning of April onwards, the Revolutionary Committee staged one mammoth demonstration after another and countless televised "struggle and repudiation meetings" against the alleged top local agents of China's Khrushchev.[32] The whole frantic campaign, however, seems to have contributed little or nothing to a solution of the problems besetting the Revolutionary Committee. By the early summer of 1967, in fact, there were indications that the Committee's hold on the city, instead of strengthening, had grown weaker.

One such indication was a widely publicized resolution, entitled "The Fight to Strengthen Proletarian Dictatorship," which the Committee adopted at the beginning of June.[33] The resolution revealed the persistence or reemergence of all the main problems which the January revolution was supposed to have solved, providing a vivid insight into the almost pathetic helplessness of the new leadership. The proletarian revolutionaries, it said, must detect, expose, repudiate and resolutely check all "evil winds" in the urban and rural areas—the evil winds of economism and of "going it alone," of speculation and market-rigging, stealing and looting, sabotage of state property, demands for the retrial of convicted counterrevolutionaries and "rightists," the sowing of discord between civilians and the military, attacks on institutions of the proletarian dictatorship and advocacy of bourgeois liberalism. Economistic "guild organizations"—meaning the trade unions—should be disbanded, and those already disbanded should be forbidden to set themselves up again. Proletarian revolutionaries must resolutely struggle against those who leave their production posts without permission, who loiter their time away, refuse to fulfill production plans, or disrupt labor discipline. The resolution even intimated that there were some who took the evil viewpoint that the greater the chaos, confusion and disorder in Shanghai, the better.

Despite the wide publicity given to this resolution, it seems to have accomplished little. Directives and injunctions of a similar nature multiplied and became more urgent and outspoken. During July, press editorials and speakers at public meetings repeatedly warned against alleged plotting by "class enemies" to produce a second "massive upheaval" and "massive chaos" in Shanghai. These enemies were said to be trying once again to drive a wedge between workers and students and to deceive the masses with pseudorevolutionary slogans of economism:

> **In the great January revolution, Shanghai's proletarian revolutionaries formed a strong union and issued an emergency appeal of great historical significance for dealing a telling blow at counterrevolutionary economism. However, its influence, which is quite extensive and penetrating, has not been completely eliminated. Recently it has managed to make a comeback. A handful of class enemies instigated a certain number of persons to demand an arbitrary change in the labor system, higher wages, and better welfare; they even put pressure on the new revolutionary order by threatening to slow down work or refuse work assignments.**[34]

Much the same thing was repeated in many other editorials and speeches during this period,[35] but despite the warnings and appeals, conflicts sharpened throughout the summer.

Neither then nor during the initial great wave of "economism" were such conflicts confined to Shanghai. Similar developments took place in practically every other major Chinese city as well as in the rural areas adjacent to them. During the summer of 1967, large-scale strikes and other forms of "economism"-inspired protest once again accompanied increasingly serious clashes and power-struggles between rival party and army factions and competing "rebel groups," not only in Shanghai but also in Wuhan, Canton, Foochow, Nanchang, Chengchow, Chengtu, Kirin, and other important centers.

By the end of August, the situation had deteriorated to such a degree that Mao apparently decided —or was either induced or compelled to decide— that it was imperative to lower the temperature of

[32] Liu's "top agents" in Shanghai were not yet explicitly named at this time, but they have since been officially identified (in an NCNA report of Oct. 7, 1967) as Chen Pei-hsien, former first secretary of the Municipal CCP Committee and a secretary of the party's East China Bureau; and the former Mayor of Shanghai, Tsao Ti-Chiu. Chen had already disappeared from view early in 1966, when he either was quietly ousted or prudently went into retreat. He remained an "unperson" until May 1967, when he was unofficially reported by the Japanese Kyodo News Agency (May 9, 1967) to have been the chief target of a Shanghai television struggle meeting. After Chen's disappearance, his functions were apparently taken over by Mayor Tsao Ti-chiu, but Tsao himself became the target of Red Guard attacks in the autumn of 1966 and also disappeared from office.

[33] Shanghai Radio, June 3, 1967.

[34] *Wen Hui Pao*, July 13, 1967.

[35] Shanghai Radio, July 6, 1967; *Chieh-fang Jih-pao*, July 7, 1967; *Wen Hui Pao*, July 5, 16, and 30, 1967.

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the Cultural Revolution. This he attempted to do by a combination of new official guidelines and personal appeals for reconciliation. He tried both tacks in Shanghai during a personal inspection tour in September to parts of East, North and Central-South China. Immediately after his visit, *Chieh-fang Jih-pao* (Sept. 26, 1967) conceded that the trial of strength between Mao's supporters and opponents had continued uninterruptedly in Shanghai ever since the allegedly victorious January revolution. "Especially during the past two or three months," the paper added, "the struggle has been more acute than ever before, and on a nationwide scale."

Mao's Retreat—Tactical or Real?

When Mao originally launched the Cultural Revolution in late 1965, it was probably his intention to isolate and defeat his powerful foes in the party, army and state hierarchy by inciting the people, especially the young, to exercise their own initiative in a gigantic movement to unseat the entrenched anti-Maoist authorities. Mao must have realized that a purge by "mass struggle" would be more hazardous than a purge conducted by a rigidly controlled secret police, and in this sense the Cultural Revolution may have been a calculated risk. It seems unlikely, however, that Mao fully foresaw what the Shanghai experience has since demonstrated with particular clarity: *i.e.*, that prolonged incitement to mass rebellion was bound sooner or later to unleash wholly undesired forms of spontaneous revolt in pursuit of the very "economist" goals which Mao had hoped to eradicate forever. Nor is the Chinese leader likely to have foreseen the depth of hatred which these mass struggles left in their wake and which divided not only the party stalwarts but the entire population into bitterly hostile camps hovering on the brink of full-scale civil war.

It was evidently to counter this increasingly acute danger that Mao—either willingly or unwillingly—embarked on his September tour and proclaimed a new political line which represented (in Communist terms) a sharp turn away from the "left" toward a "center" position. Henceforth, the counterrevolutionary enemy was no longer to be found exclusively on the "right," but in equal measure on the "ultra-left." And instead of his former constant emphasis on the (originally Stalinist) thesis of an ever-sharpening class struggle during the period of socialist construction, Mao used his September visit to Shanghai to disparage conflict and to stress the need for unity and all-round cooperation. On September 15, *Wen Hui Pao* quoted him as having said that unless the young fully unite and cooperate with the experienced old party cadres, "our cause will come to a stop." He also issued a new dictum, since described as "Chairman Mao's latest instruction" which "everyone must learn to understand":

There is no basic conflict of interest in the ranks of the working class. Under the proletarian dictatorship, there is no reason whatsoever for the ranks of the workers' party to be split into two big factions bitterly opposed to each other.[36]

It remains to be seen whether this new "instruction" represents merely a temporary tactical retreat on Mao's part, or whether it may conceivably signify that he was reluctantly persuaded or compelled to lend his personal authority to a genuine attempt at reestablishing order and cohesion by letting the Cultural Revolution quietly fade away.

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[36] *Wen Hui Pao*, Sept. 20, 1967.

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Private Production in Soviet Agriculture

By Karl-Eugen Wädekin

Private agricultural production is in every way alien to the Soviet system: economically—because it is not amenable to direct planning and involves unsocialized labor; socio-economically—because for a large part of the population it constitutes a basic livelihood that the state or collective system does not adequately provide, and because such unregulated earning power reduces the effect of state policy on incomes; politically and ideologically—because it involves private ownership of cattle as well as of small farm implements and buildings, thus contradicting the Marxist-Leninist position on socialization of the means of production. To be sure, the land is not privately owned and remains state property, its use being subject to sundry regulations. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of practical economics, the institution of individual plots bears a marked resemblance to private ownership of the means of production.

Soviet policy toward the private agricultural sector is especially indicative of the country's internal economic situation, since it clearly shows to what extent the Kremlin is prepared, at any given time, to let economic necessities take precedence over ideological misgivings.

In the USSR, private farming is more than just an adjunct of the collective system, which permits kolkhoz members to tend their own small plots of land and keep a little livestock within limits laid down in the kolkhoz statutes. Sovkhoz (state farm) workers and non-farm manual and office workers located in rural areas, small towns, or on the fringes of cities also tend private plots and raise livestock for supplemental income. Since the non-farm population living in the countryside has notably increased within the last decade—from 27-28 million (1955) to 37-38 million (1965)[1]—and because

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[1] These figures were checked by the author in *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft,* No. 1, 1967, p. 46.

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millions of kolkhoz farmers were converted into sovkhoz workers, private enterprise outside the collectives has become much more significant, while kolkhoz plots have decreased in size and number. At least one-third of private farming (accounting for 8-10 percent of total Soviet farm production, including fruit-growing) is done by non-farm workers; and at most two-thirds by kolkhoz members (15-20 percent of total production).[2]

Most often the significance of private enterprise in agriculture is measured by the amount of land involved. But this is misleading because field crops play a minor role, while livestock accounts for approximately three-fourths of all private agricultural production. Fodder is therefore the main problem of private farming. Only a small amount of it, apart from potatoes, is grown on private plots; grain, hay, straw, green fodder, and silage come from the socialized sector, partly as wages in kind. Aside from that, private producers have the right to graze their livestock on unused or little-used state and kolkhoz land.

Ideologically, the position of the Soviet authorities is clear and has never varied much. Private production is considered a transitional phenomenon that will gradually die out as progress is made toward a perfect Communist social order, and as the state and collective farms become able to supply the entire population with food. This was reaffirmed by the party program of 1961.

The "only" problem is that socialized agriculture in the Soviet Union has at no time been able to feed the whole population adequately. Private production therefore was, and is, indispensable. What is more, when harsh measures are taken against the private sector, the socialized sector suffers too, so that not only private agricultural production, but all agricultural production declines or stagnates. And even if total production were to expand, the private sector could not be abolished in the foreseeable future because population growth, combined with rapid industrialization and urbanization, makes greater demands on agriculture every year, in terms of both quantity and quality.

Thus, if the basic Soviet ideological position on private enterprise has remained essentially the same since collectivization, practical economic and social policies have shifted in an attempt to cope with the problem of food supply. The Soviet leaders have been forced to make use of the contributions of small private producers to solve the food problem. At the same time, they would like to be in a position to reduce popular interest in private production, so that it might lose its significance in keeping with their ideological prediction.

If the output of the kolkhozes and sovhozes could be increased sufficiently—and, more important, quickly enough—the problem would readily be solved. But this is just what has been impossible, so that private enterprise has had to be called to the rescue, and appropriate concessions made to it. That is precisely what happened in the second half of the 1930's, during World War II and the early postwar years, after Stalin's death, and again after Khrushchev was deposed. Whenever the Soviets believed they had mastered the food problem and therefore could do away with, or at least reduce, private production, it again proved indispensable, and again concessions had to be made. Most recently, Khrushchev's successors introduced a new set of concessions to private production, probably hoping that such a move would not only win a measure of popularity for the regime but also benefit the economy.

To understand the pragmatic character and transitory significance of the measures taken during 1964-65, it will be helpful to take a look at the effects of policy toward the private sector between 1953 and 1964. Two distinct phases can be noted, each of which may in turn be subdivided into two parts.

The Liberal Phase

I). During 1953-54, the number of privately-owned cattle registered an astonishingly rapid rise after having declined in the last years of Stalin's reign. The overall target for October 1, 1954, was surpassed by October 1, 1953. Only the goal for cows was not quite attained, while the hog population soared to 20.2 million as compared with a target of 8.5 million.[3] This increase must have

[2] Cf. Karl-Eugen Wädekin: *Privatproduzenten in der sowjetischen Landwirtschaft*, Cologne, Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1967, chapter III/2 and Appendix B. For details see Wädekin, in *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), No 7, 1967, p. 421 ff.

[3] Actual figures in *Selskoe khoziaistvo SSSR*, Moscow, 1960, p. 266 ff. and *Narodnoe khoziaistvo: 1956*, Moscow, 1957, p. 129 ff.; target figures may be indirectly derived from *Postanovlenie* of Sept. 21, 1953, in *Direktivy KPSS i Sovetskovo pravitelstva po khoziaistvennym voprosam*, Vol. IV, 1958, p. 65.

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begun very soon after Stalin's death, and before Khrushchev's September 1953 speech attacking Stalin's agricultural policies; otherwise such levels could not have been attained by October 1, 1953. By the end of 1954, however, there were signs that the party, now under Khrushchev, was worried about the outstanding success of private agriculture.

II). Between 1955 and 1957, Khrushchev took his first measures to check the growth of private production. Even the virgin lands program, introduced in 1954, was indirectly aimed at the private sector since the state hoped to end its dependence on private grain production by making a greater effort to increase socialized production.

Two decrees of March 6, 1956, dealing with changes in the kolkhoz statutes and pay rates for kolkhoz labor, were undisguisedly directed against the private plots of collective-farm members. A further decree of August 27, 1956, was especially aimed at the raising of livestock by city dwellers: it forbade them to feed cattle with grain and other foodstuffs bought in state-owned stores and introduced special taxes on their livestock. As a result, the number of livestock owned by urban workers had already decreased noticeably by October 1, 1956.[4] By contrast, the consequences in the kolkhozes were at first negligible: the increase in private cattle-raising slackened, but there was no perceptible drop in either the number of livestock or the size of landholdings per individual until the end of 1957—probably thanks to the record harvest of 1956.[5]

The Reaction

I). The drive against the private agricultural sector reached its high point in 1958-60. It should be pointed out that the decree of January 1, 1958, which abolished mandatory deliveries by private producers, was only seemingly in their favor. What it really meant is evident from an earlier comment by Khrushchev on May 17, 1956:

I must frankly say that if we relied mainly on the private producer, we would be confessing our own helplessness. If one supports this "theory," it will turn against the kolkhozes and the kolkhoz system.

We must now take a course that will eventually enable us to dispense with meat and milk deliveries from individual producers and to rely for everything on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. This is the real solution to the problem, and it will be confirmed in theory and practice by the indisputable advantages of our great socialistic enterprises over private ones. We cannot keep on pressing kolkhoz members to develop their individual enterprises and constantly demanding that they deliver their livestock products to the state. We must above all develop the socialized economy.[6]

This policy against private enterprise was an important element in Khrushchev's overall plan for the years 1958-60 and was most clearly manifested in the following six points of his agricultural program:

1) Reduction in the size of privately-farmed plots, not only in kolkhozes, but also in sovkhozes and towns.

2) Measures to curb the private raising of livestock, mainly through forced purchases by kolkhozes and the state).

3) Restrictions on the distribution of feed rations, on grazing rights, and especially on payments in kind to kolkhoz members.

4) Transformation of kolkhozes into sovkhozes, involving a reduction of the land and livestock holdings of the converted kolkhoz farmers. (This helps to explain why Khrushchev was so vehemently opposed to secondary occupations for *sovkhoz* workers, but it was not, of course, the only purpose of the "*sovkhozizatsiia.*"

5) Renewed, though covert, propagation of Khrushchev's old idea of "agro-towns"[7]—*i.e.*, settlements with several thousand inhabitants, who would live in huge apartment houses and have no land or, at most, minimal plots and numbers of livestock.

6) Steps to restrict the so-called "free" kolkhoz markets, where individuals may sell their own produce.

These measures resulted in a severe cutback in private production. But by the end of 1960, it became clear that they, in conjunction with other measures taken by Khrushchev, were also having disastrous consequences for the whole of Soviet agriculture.[8] That is why Khrushchev, at a plenary

[4] *Chislennost skota v SSSR*, Moscow, 1957, pp. 210, 217, 224, 231, 238. See also Wädekin, in *Osteuropa*, No. 8, 1967, p. 517 ff.

[5] Wädekin, *Privatproduzenten* . . . , p. 44, table 11.

[6] N. S. Khrushchev, *Stroitelstvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitie selskovo khoziaistva*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 226.

[7] For example, *Izvestia*, June 10, 1959, September 21 and December 16, 1960.

[8] A good overall survey of the development of those years is furnished by Jerzy F. Karcz: "Seven years on the Farm—Retrospect and Prospect," in: *New Directions in the Soviet Economy* (Joint Economic Committee, ed.), Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1966, pp. 410-20.

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session of the Central Committee in January 1961, was far more reticent on the subject of private production than he had been during the previous three years.

II. From 1961 to 1964, there was stagnation in both socialized and private agriculture, leading to an easing of the policy against private production. Not that Khrushchev's basic ideas underwent any change during the last years of his rule, but the reverses suffered by his agricultural policy, aggravated by the poor harvest of 1963,[9] forced him to exercise greater restraint. Only with respect to the private production of sovkhoz workers were restrictions carried on with the same severity as before, facilitating further reduction of private plots in sovkhozes in 1963-64. As far as the urban population was concerned, restrictions on animal husbandry also became even more severe.

Post-Khrushchev Policy

After Khrushchev's fall, one of the first acts of the new government was the announcement, in Brezhnev's speech of November 6, 1964, of a sharp change in policy toward private production. Just two days previously, on November 4, the tax on cattle owned by city dwellers, introduced in 1956, had been repealed.[10] The new regime was taking a serious and positive interest in the private sector and expected a favorable popular response.

As in 1953,[11] the population seems to have immediately gathered new hope. A Soviet writer reported from his home village in Riazan province that "in mid-October, when the people heard about the plenum" (immediately after Khrushchev's removal), "the women began saying that the confiscated plots would be returned."[12] But he also perceived the villagers' mistrust, based on previous experience. Their reaction was:

Once again the story is: we'll give you your plots back and ease up on your livestock-raising. . . . They're all nimble with words, but when it comes to action. . . .[13]

The new regulations outlined in Brezhnev's speech dealt with all six points of Khrushchev's campaign.

1 & 2) *Size of plots and ownership of livestock:* In the Ukraine, important steps were taken even before Brezhnev's speech, thus making it clear that the basic decisions on these two points had been made immediately after Khrushchev's downfall. The republican party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers issued a joint decree ordering kolkhozes "to restore farm plots to their former size and reinstate the norms for privately-owned livestock, which have been unreasonably reduced since 1955;

— Комиссия уехала?

— Пошли дальше...

Рисунок М. ВАЙСБОРДА

PICTURE PERFECT

Above: "Has the committee gone?"
Below: "Well, let's go on to the next one."
(Sign on booth reads "Vegetables.")

—From Krokodil *(Moscow), No. 32, 1966.*

[9] See Karcz, *op. cit.*, pp. 420-22.
[10] *Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika*, 6th edition, Moscow, 1966, p. 401 ff. (Hereafter *Spravochnik.*)
[11] See Wädekin: "Der Kreml und der Privatsektor," *Osteuropa*, No. 7, 1967, p. 415 ff.
[12] S. Krutilin, *Lipiagi*, Moscow, 1966, p. 620.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 623.

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to extend every assistance to hard-working kolkhoz farmers in acquiring livestock; to provide pasture and feed for their livestock; and to put an immediate end to the arbitrary reduction of farm plots." [14] A second decree of the same date rescinded the prohibition or reduction of private livestock-raising in towns; and in sovkhozes which had been converted from kolkhozes, the former kolkhoz members who had already passed the retirement age were to keep or be given back their original farm plots, unreduced in size.[15]

What is noteworthy about these Ukrainian decrees, other than their early publication date, is their reference to the year 1955. In so doing, they indirectly branded as "unwarranted" the reduction of plots decreed on March 6, 1956.

Two decrees for the Russian SFSR appeared on November 13, that is, only a week after Brezhnev's speech. Their wording was similar to that of the Ukrainian decrees, with the important difference that the year 1955 was not mentioned.[16] Thus, although the abrogation of "unwarranted" restrictions was also recommended in the RSFSR, there was no explicit indication which restrictions were to be considered "unwarranted" and which were not.

Since the full texts of these decrees were not published in the generally accessible news media, it is not possible to interpret them with exactitude. Obviously, the desire was to avoid a public statement of policy and to leave a definitive regulation of the entire problem, as far as the kolkhoz population was concerned, to the new kolkhoz statutes to be enacted by the Third Kolkhoz Congress scheduled for 1966. The fact that this congress has still not taken place would seem to indicate that to this day there are still differences of opinion over collective farm regulations.

Regulations on the use of farmland by sovkhoz workers were clearly stipulated. The maximum size of a normal sovkhoz plot was increased from 0.15 to 0.30 hectare,[17] and in the Ukraine up to 0.40 hectare.[18] For non-farm workers living in the countryside, the standards remained largely unchanged; but the category of "specialists," who came under separate preferential regulations, was considerably broadened.[19]

Regulations concerning livestock-raising by sovkhoz workers were unclear. They continued to differ from locality to locality and to be governed by internal directives issued by sovkhoz ministries prior to 1960. However, the normal limits are again, as a rule, probably a cow, a calf, the calves born during the year, a hog over six months old, and three lambs and goats over six months old.[20]

Further decrees and official instructions favored private ownership of livestock. The State Bank was given authority to make loans to those kolkhoz members and workers who did not own a cow and wished to purchase a cow or a calf.[21] State agencies were instructed to resume the sale of fodder and forage to private owners of livestock.[22] Several measures generally designed to make livestock-raising more profitable also benefited private owners—such as an increase in the price of milk, a lowering of its prescribed fat content, and payment for meat deliveries at retail prices; on the other hand, private owners did not benefit from the 50 percent premium on above-plan deliveries of live cattle.[23]

3) *Cattle feed and payments in kind:* Regarding payments in kind to kolkhoz workers, the Ukraine again appeared in the role of pioneer. As announced by the Ukrainian First Party Secretary at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum in March 1965, recommendations went out to Ukrainian kolkhozes to distribute 15 to 20 percent of their grain and 10 to 15 percent of their potato crop as wages in kind, and furthermore to "fix the percentage of raw fodder for distribution according to local conditions." [24]

Although Brezhnev himself did not go into the matter of payments in kind, Soviet comment following the March plenum was so frequent and favorable that there can be no doubt that the regime was at least planning to improve the system. For example, in a publication to which a leading agricultural official (Gaponenko) is a contributor, it was stated that consideration should be given not only to the "personal needs of kolkhoz members for grain and other produce"—*i.e.*, for human consumption—but also to "provisions of fodder for their livestock." [25]

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[14] *Pravda Ukrainy*, Nov. 5, 1964, p. 1.
[15] *Idem.*
[16] *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, Nov. 14, 1964, p. 1.
[17] P. Usikov in *Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia*, No. 1, 1965, p. 103.
[18] I. Cherniak, *ibid.*, No. 7, 1965, p. 95.
[19] Usikov and Cherniak, *loc. cit., passim.*
[20] See Borodanov-Cherniak, *Otvety na voprosy kolkhoznikov . . . .*, Moscow, 1960, p. 46.
[21] *Spravochnik*, p. 296.
[22] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, Dec. 9, 1964, p. 40.
[23] *Spravochnik*, p. 149 ff., 188, 178 ff.
[24] *Plenum Tsentralnovo Komiteta . . .* (March 24-26, 1965), Moscow, 1965, p. 40. (Hereafter *Plenum.*)
[25] G. S. Gaponenko, M. K. Gritskov, I. K. Popova: *Osnovnye printsipy planirovaniia selskovo khoziaistva*, Moscow, 1965, p. 69.

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One year later, a decree "On Increasing the Material Interest of Kolkhoz Members in Social Production" signified a fundamental endorsement of the principle of payment in kind. It provided that "in apportioning the income of a kolkhoz, work compensation shall have priority," and kolkhozes shall accumulate a "guaranteed fund of produce . . . consisting of a specific part of the grain harvest and other produce," so that members can receive their portions "and also fodder for their livestock within the framework of guaranteed work compensation." [26]

In the sovkhozes as well, greater consideration was given to the need for payments in kind as a component of work compensation. In March 1965, the First Party Secretary of Tambov province advised the sovkhozes to "examine the possibilities of paying the workers certain wages in kind and perhaps selling them grain (even if in limited quantities), as well as forage, silage, green fodder, shoats and chicks, at procurement prices." [27]

In the spring of 1966, a lengthy article in the agricultural journal of the Central Committee reaffirmed the half-forgotten right of sovkhoz managers to distribute up to 10 percent of their potatoes, vegetables and fruit as wages in kind. Grain, it appears, could be distributed, as before, only to those who took part in the harvest. Similarly, workers who owned livestock and assisted in the harvesting of hay, straw, and silage could receive up to 10 percent of the hay and silage and up to 20 percent of the straw. Furthermore, special supplementary allotments were permitted in the virgin lands, where most of the grain regions farmed by sovkhozes are located.[28] How often the managers have made use of this right, especially when the harvest was bad and the delivery plan could not be fulfilled, is another question. Still, the percentages given above are important as guidelines.

4 & 5) *Sovkhozes and agro-towns:* The notion of "agro-towns," or similar agrarian settlements not called by this name, and the transformation of kolkhozes into sovkhozes have not been promoted since Khrushchev's removal. The relatively few conversions of kolkhozes into sovkhozes in 1965, and the still fewer in 1966, may be considered to signify a continuing preference for sovkhozes but not a vigorous continuation of the *sovkhozizatsiia* campaign.

The development and modernization of agricultural villages continues to receive prominent mention in the Soviet press. Attention is devoted to both kolkhoz and sovkhoz villages, and to both one-family and multifamily houses. Most frequently mentioned are multifamily houses of two or three stories, to be erected in the central village of an agrarian unit. They would mainly house "specialists" and "cadre" personnel, as well as teachers, doctors, etc.; most of the ordinary workers would continue living in one- or two-family houses.

It has been stated repeatedly that only small individual plots will be distributed along with the new houses, but that additional vegetable gardens are to be made available outside the settlements. From time to time, it is also proposed that privately-owned livestock be kept in large communal stalls.[29] Such communal operations could, of course, serve as a pretext for some future campaign against the private sector. In fact, since this village planning is meant to cover a prolonged period of years, it suggests that the option of reviving restrictions on the private sector is being kept open.

6) *Kolkhoz markets:* Even before the Central Committee met on March 13, 1965, a comprehensive decree was issued which dealt primarily with "the improvement of trade and the restaurant business in rural areas" but also touched on the question of kolkhoz markets.[30] It called for an improvement of the organization of trade in these markets, and for better equipment and new market halls. The ministries of the Union Republics were directed to increase the supply of privately-produced foodstuffs to the kolkhoz markets, to improve transportation facilities, hotels, restaurants and service industries in their vicinity, and to provide for the construction and repair of sales premises. At the same time, it was announced that new "model regulations for trade in kolkhoz markets" were being drawn up. Soon afterwards, the Union Republics issued appropriate decrees. Their substance was discussed in the ordinary press, although the full texts were not made available to the general public. In addition, articles on the promotion of kolkhoz trade appeared in a wide variety of newspapers and called for the removal of former impediments to such trade. Nevertheless, others warned that kolkhoz markets might afford too much scope for "speculation." [31]

[26] *Selskaia zhizn*, May 18, 1966, p. 1.
[27] *Plenum*, p. 58.
[28] *Selskaia zhizn*, May 25, 1966, p. 1.
[29] See *Selskaia zhizn*, April 16, 28, and 30, 1966.
[30] Full text in *Spravochnik*, pp. 303-314.
[31] More details about revival of kolkhoz markets in Wädekin, *Privatproduzenten . . .*, p. 82 ff.

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The new, well-meaning attitude of the government toward kolkhoz markets did not in all cases bring about an immediate change; sometimes local authorities surreptitiously or even openly resisted the new instructions. As late as the spring of 1966, the Deputy Minister of Trade was still deploring this opposition and indicating that kolkhoz trade was not everywhere developing as it should.[32] Nevertheless, in 1965, the total turnover of urban kolkhoz markets managed to rise slightly (to what extent has not been precisely disclosed), and prices declined by an overall 6 percent.[33] The same sluggish trend continued in 1966,[34] but no later figures have been published. Thus, despite the new regulations, a significant rise in turnover or drop in kolkhoz market prices can no longer be expected.

Newspaper and magazine articles, together with measures taken in 1965 and 1966, made it clear that the kolkhoz markets were not to be turned over to private sellers. Consumer cooperatives and the kolkhozes themselves were to exercise more control over the markets by increasing their share of the turnover. This view was also in evidence during the 1965 revival of discussions concerning the creation of kolkhoz associations (*kolkhozsoiuzy*).[35]

The kolkhoz markets and private agricultural production are closely related. An increase in private production leads to an increased volume of trade in kolkhoz markets, and revived trade in these markets in turn offers a stimulus to private production. The opposite chain reaction—restriction of private production and decline of kolkhoz markets—was given a practical demonstration under Khrushchev.

In the free kolkhoz markets, violations of the planning principle leap straight to the eye, and for the economic bureaucracy they represent an especially irksome aspect of private production. Hence the particularly strong opposition of dogmatic officials to any liberalization of the kolkhoz market system. This negative reaction is in fact only one conspicuous symptom of a more general phenomenon—a lack of unanimous support among the party and government rank-and-file for the leadership's more liberal attitude toward the whole private sector, even though the regime has declared that its present policy is only meant to be temporary.

Reservations were also expressed by certain speakers at the Central Committee session in March 1965. For example, V. P. Mzhavanadze, First Party Secretary of Georgia and a Politburo Candidate Member, referred to the suspension of restrictions on private enterprise as merely "a secondary question." "The basic and principal question for our party," he said, "was and remains the question of the quickest possible development of a socialist economy."[36] Characteristic, too, is the following statement from a recent book by A. G. Koriagin:

Today in some places private production no longer plays an important role, and it would be wrong to revive it. . . . The fact that the party and government have lifted the unfounded restrictions on personal subsistence economy should by no means be taken as an intention to further its development.[37]

Problems, Old and New

While it is true that certain restrictions have been lifted and previously confiscated private plots returned, it must be pointed out that the actual condition of private agricultural activity still leaves much to be desired. The 3-percent increase in the average size of a kolkhoz member's plot, achieved between November 1964 and November 1965,[38] was too small to have much effect. Admittedly, the size of private plots farmed by sovkhoz and nonfarm manual and office workers increased much more sharply during the same period, namely by 500,000 hectares, or one-fifth.[39] But even where sovkhoz workers are concerned, the best that can be said is that no more than a significant beginning has been made toward implementing the decrees of November 1964. While the area covered by sovkhoz plots may have increased by more than one-fifth, according to the decrees it should have doubled.

Soviet publications of the last three years make it clear that in reality the development of private agriculture has not proceeded smoothly or uniformly. After some very positive and optimistic statements in support of the private sector during the first months following Khrushchev's fall, there were both covert and overt warnings against an excessive relaxation of policy toward private production, especially with respect to kolkhoz markets

[32] N. Kuzmenkov, *Selskaia shizn*, April 26, 1966, p. 3.
[33] Annual Statistical Report in *Selskaia zhizn*, Feb. 3, 1966.
[34] Annual Statistical Report in *Selskaia zhizn*, Jan. 29, 1967.
[35] See *Selskaia zhizn*, April 4, 1966, p. 3.
[36] *Plenum*, p. 90.
[37] A. G. Koriagin, *Vosproizvodstvo v sotsialisticheskom selskom khoziaistve*, Moscow, 1966, p. 365.
[38] Wädekin, *Privatproduzenten . . .*, p. 44, table 11.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 16, table 1.

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A PROFITABLE SIDELINE

— Сколько развелось овощеводов! И все благодаря нам.

Рисунок С. КУЗЬМИНА

Caption: **"Look how many vegetable growers have cropped up! And it's all thanks to us." (Men carry papers from the "City Fruit and Vegetable Market.")**

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 15, 1967.

and the size of plots. The latest statistical yearbook shows that in 1965 socialized agricultural enterprise produced no more than in 1964, while the private sector increased its production by almost 8 percent.[40] Early figures released on total agricultural output for 1965 were later revised upward several times, presumably because private production turned in better results than anticipated. This is reminiscent of the situation in 1953-54 and may have added to the differences of opinion that have existed behind the scenes.

In drafting new kolkhoz statutes, the Ukrainian leadership again seemed especially liberal, proposing to fix the maximum permissible size of individual private plots for kolkhoz members at 0.6 hectare.[41] However, in the neighboring Russian province of Rostov, where natural conditions are similar to those in most of the Ukraine, a kolkhoz member had this to say in a letter published in one of the agricultural journals of the Central Committee:

The private plots should not be large. For each *kolkhoznik* who takes part in kolkhoz work, 0.1 hectare is enough. (This means 0.1 to 0.3 hectare per family.) Some comrades have proposed sizes of 0.5 to 0.75 hectare. I feel that a toiling *kolkhoznik*, one who is really interested in the output of his kolkhoz, is not in a position to farm such an area.[42]

On a kolkhoz in Oriol province, moreover, changes in the statutes were still being made—and being approved by the district administration—in April 1965, even though they were in open contradiction to the decree of November 13, 1964.[43] That the new policy toward private farming has not always been taken seriously, even in the sovkhozes, is demonstrated by the example of one sovkhoz manager who simply ignored the new instructions.[44]

Although forced mass sales of privately-owned livestock, such as were carried out in 1959-60, are disapproved of today, voluntary sales continue to be looked upon with favor. Just how voluntary they are depends on local conditions at any given time. Right now they may be for the most part voluntary—and therefore rare—but this does not necessarily mean that such will be the case in a year or two.

An official report on an ordinance issued by the RSFSR Council of Ministers one year after Khrushchev's overthrow and dealing with the implemen-

[40] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo*, 1965, p. 260.
[41] V. Komiakhov, *Kommunist*, No. 9, 1966, p. 31.
[42] P. Ponomarenko, *Selskaia zhizn*, Jan. 22, 1966, p. 3.
[43] G. Baklanov, *Izvestia*, Jan. 28, 1966, p. 6.
[44] *Selskaia zhizn*, Aug. 9, 1966, p. 2.

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tation of the decree of November 13, 1964,[45] confirmed in all clarity that the examples and opinions cited above were symptomatic and not isolated cases. The exact wording of this new ordinance was not published, but the official announcement concerning it states that in 1964-65 there was considerable local opposition or delay in carrying out measures favoring the private farming sector. Late in 1966 there were again calls, in Riazan province, for a reduction in private farming; and what is more, *Pravda* printed these views.[46] On April 26, *Sovetskaia Rossiia* published a sharp attack on conspicuously prosperous private sheep-breeding in the Daghestan ASSR.

Furthermore, one could not help noticing that, during the 23rd Party Congress in March-April 1966, Prime Minister Kosygin said only a few, not very emphatic words in favor of the private sector, while party General Secretary Brezhnev did not refer to the subject at all. The year 1966 came to an end with matters dangling in mid-air. The debate over private production and the size of plots gradually died down, and the Kolkhoz Congress, officially announced for 1966, did not convene and therefore could not adopt model kolkhoz statutes. Throughout the year 1967 as well, the subject of private agricultural production has hardly ever been mentioned.[47]

At the present time, nobody—even in leading Soviet circles—can say with certainty what direction Soviet farm policy will take with regard to the private sector. The events since Khrushchev's fall clearly demonstrate that conflicting tendencies are affecting the charting of a new course. It is also clear that the relatively liberal measures taken toward private agriculture since late 1964 have been carried out with delay, and sometimes with great reluctance, by the middle and lower echelons of the party and government, probably not without some backing from Moscow. The postponement of the Kolkhoz Congress—for the time being *sine die*—is the most striking evidence of this internal state of affairs.

It is hardly a coincidence that public debate over new kolkhoz statutes subsided just as it became certain that 1966 would bring a record harvest. At present, therefore, the regime is less dependent on private production than it was in 1965. More very good harvests in the year to come could lead to a harder line toward private production, as happened a decade ago after the harvests of 1956 and 1958. It would not be the first such cycle in Soviet agricultural policy. But in view of the rapidly rising demands that Soviet agriculture must satisfy, the consequences of discouraging private production would be as serious as in the past.

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[45] *Selskaia zhizn*, Nov. 4, 1965, p. 3.
[46] *Pravda*, Dec. 24, 1966, p. 2.
[47] One of the few exceptions was M. Osadko's "Konsultatsiia," in *Ekonomika selskovo khoziaistva*, No. 5, 1967.

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From Moscow to Peking

DONALD W. TREADGOLD, ED.: *Soviet and Chinese Communism. Similarities and Differences.* Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1967.

Reviewed by Klaus Mehnert

TO REVIEW A BOOK containing essays by twenty contributors is almost like reviewing twenty books and might better be done by as many reviewers. In any case, it would be impossible, in a brief review, to discuss all twenty essays individually, and it therefore seems more appropriate to focus on the question of whether or not the book as a whole fulfills the expectations created by the title. The answer is yes and no, with the balance tipped in favor of the affirmative.

The ideal way to treat the similarities and differences between the Soviet and Chinese forms of communism would no doubt have been to select a number of subject areas—*e.g.*, ideology, politics, economic organization—and have each dealt with by a single scholar equally versed in both the Soviet and Chinese sides of the picture, or alternatively by a pair of experts, one on the Soviet side and the other on the Chinese, working together and combining their knowledge in a joint paper. However, there are still not enough experts equally familiar with Soviet and Chinese affairs to make the first approach feasible, and the second would require pairing off corresponding area specialists and shutting them up together for a number of days in a kind of Sino-Soviet seclusion—hardly feasible either. The able editor of the present compilation, Professor Donald W. Treadgold, has done the next best thing: he has selected and assembled a number of the papers which were originally presented at the June 1965 conference on international communism at Lake Tahoe, California, juxtaposing essays by a Sovietologist and a China specialist on each of various subjects—such as the historical background of the respective revolutions, the evolution of the respective Communist parties, the cultural policies of the respective regimes, etc.—and prefacing these complementary discussions in many instances with a comparative summary from the pen of a third scholar. The result is a book that tells us a great deal about the USSR and Communist China individually, as well as something about their similarities and differences.

THE BOOK does contain some individual papers covering a certain aspect of both systems. Of these, the reviewer found particularly enlightening the essays of K. C. Yeh ("Soviet and Chinese Industrialization Strategies") and of Harold D. Lasswell ("Russia and China in a Modernizing World"), and among the comparative summaries that of Gregory Grossman ("Strategies and Tactics of Economic Development"). Among the one-country studies, he found himself most impressed by that of Richard Pipes ("Communism and Russian His-

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tory"). The other contributors—all of them leading names in their respective fields—are: George E. Taylor, Lucian W. Pye, Merle Fainsod, J. M. H. Lindbeck, Jerome Alan Cohen, Leon Lipson, Ezra F. Vogel, Mark G. Field, Victor Erlich, T. H. Chen, Sidney Monas, Franz Schurmann, Alexander Dallin, Richard Lowenthal, and Donald S. Zagoria.

Reviewers in This Issue

KLAUS MEHNERT—Author of *Peking and Moscow* (New York, Putnam, 1963) and *Soviet Man and His World* (New York, Praeger, 1962); editor of *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart, Germany).

MELVIN CROAN—Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin (Madison), and frequent contributor to *Problems of Communism.*

MALCOLM MACKINTOSH—Consultant to Stanford Research Institute, (Washington, DC), and author of *Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces* (New York, Macmillan, 1967).

JAMES MCKEE—An American student of Soviet affairs and new contributor to this journal.

VLADIMIR PETROV—On the staff of the Sino-Soviet Institute at George Washington University; author of *Money and Conquest: Allied Occupation Currencies in World War II* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967).

LUCIAN W. PYE—Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; author of *Southeast Asia's Political Systems* (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1967) and *Aspects of Political Development: An Analytic Study* (Boston, Little Brown, 1966).

TAMAS ACZEL—Hungarian author who left his country in 1956, now Lecturer in English at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst); author (with Tibor Meray) of *The Revolt of The Mind: A Case History of Intellectual Resistance Behind the Iron Curtain* (New York, Praeger, 1959).

JAN S. PRYBYLA—Associate Professor of Economics at Pennsylvania State University (University Park); co-editor of *World Tensions: Conflict and Accommodation* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967).

The reviewer, whose reading (if, alas, not his knowledge) has in recent years been rather evenly divided between Soviet and Chinese affairs, found reaffirmed in this book an impression he has had for some time—namely, that the Western observers of Soviet Russia are on very much firmer ground than are the "China watchers." Apart from the reasons advanced for this in Professor Treadgold's introduction, one can point to other explanations, notably the age difference between the two Communist states (50 *vs.* 18 years), the secretiveness of present-day China (which far exceeds that of the USSR even in the heyday of Stalinism in the mid-1930's, when this reviewer traveled all alone throughout the length and breadth of the country), and finally the fact that Peking has deviated sharply from the Soviet path generally accepted in the West as the "normal" model of Marxist-Leninist development. Since the papers in this volume were originally presented, moreover, the picture in China has become even more blurred, with the result that China experts today perforce speak with even greater uncertainty and caution than in 1965.

BEARING IN MIND these limitations, what emerges from the comparison between Soviet and Chinese communism? This reviewer is inclined to go along with those participants in the symposium who view the differences between the two systems as stemming more from their differing stages of development at any given moment than from differences in cultural background. Like Pipes and Taylor, the reviewer does not believe that the triumph of communism was historically inevitable in either country. "Had they [the Great Reforms of Alexander II] been continued," writes Pipes, "imperial Russia might well have made a more or less peaceful transition to modern statehood" (p. 12 f).

As for China, Taylor observes, "Up to 1935 the story of China's modern development is not one of a predestined move toward communism. On the contrary . . . The destruction brought about the Sino-Japanese War broke the backbone of the . . . National Government . . . The Communists were given a second chance" (p. 28 f).

The section comparing the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties (Pye, Fainsod, Lindbeck) is the one that has been relatively most affected by Mao's "second revolution" of 1966-67. In particular, Professor Pye's tentative statement that "party organization and practices are now impeding developments in both countries" may have to

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be modified to take into account the apparent deep division in the ranks of the CCP. For if Mao's constant accusations regarding the Khrushchevite character of the bulk of the established party apparatus are correct, it would mean that the CCP is still in the hands of men who are more rational, pragmatic and progressive than the reactionary-utopian Maoist leadership.

In the area of economic development, Dr. Yeh finds the Soviet record "by and large . . . much better" than the Chinese (p. 362). "An economy advancing from a subsistence level [as in both Russia and China] can ill afford waste and errors," he points out, and while the waste and errors in Russia were great, they were relatively less serious than those witnessed in China since 1958—perhaps largely because the Maoists desperately wanted to be different from their Russian mentors and fell victim to their own propaganda about "men being more important than machines" (or atom bombs, for that matter), and "redness" more important than "expertness."

Comparisons of Moscow's and Peking's foreign policies have followed a well-trodden path for a number of years, and Messrs. Lowenthal and Zagoria ably sum up the main points. Since their papers were written, the two Communist power centers have moved still farther apart in world affairs generally and in their relationships to the Third World, as the Glassboro summit meeting and the Middle East conflict have shown.

IN A NUMBER of areas, the age difference of roughly thirty years between the two Communist systems is, in the reviewer's opinion, of crucial importance. Bearing this in mind, it seems wrong to compare the genuine cultural thaw in the USSR in 1954 (the 37th year of Soviet rule) with China's phony "Hundred Flowers" interlude (in the 8th year of the People's Republic). The Hundred Flowers episode was more likely a counterpart to the encouraging but brief period of cultural relaxation that intervened in the Soviet Union after the domination of the radical Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) was ended in the 15th year of the Soviet regime (1932). China's thaw, the reviewer fears, is still a long way off, but when it comes, it may well be just as genuine as the Russian one. By the same token, China's present "Stalinist" judicial practices may eventually undergo the same transformation toward greater legality that Russia's did—and for the same reason: to give increased security to those groups of people whose participation is essential to the modernization of the country, *i. e.*, mainly but not exclusively the new upper strata of economic administrators, technicians and scientists.

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Loyalties and Politics in Vietnam

ROBERT A. RUPEN AND ROBERT FARRELL, EDS.: *Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Dispute.*
New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.
DONALD S. ZAGORIA: *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi.*
New York, Pegasus, 1967.

Reviewed by Melvin Croan

FOR ALL THE INTENSIVE reportage and critical dissection of the war in Vietnam, relatively little attention has been paid to the question of Vietnam's role in the politics of the international Communist movement in general, or to its impact upon the Sino-Soviet schism in particular. To be sure, some Western commentators have contended for a long time that the American involvement in the Vietnam war could serve to realign Sino-Soviet interests. Other observers—first and foremost certain specialists on Sino-Soviet relations—have rejoined that, if anything, the Vietnam war has served to deepen Sino-Soviet tensions and thus to exacerbate hostility between Peking and Moscow. Both of the books under review address themselves squarely to the question of the Vietnam war and the Sino-Soviet dispute. Each of them argues quite convincingly that the impact of Vietnam upon Sino-Soviet relations has indeed been disruptive so far.

Of these two books, the volume edited by Robert A. Rupen and Robert Farrell must be deemed the less satisfactory. For one thing, it is further behind events; for another, it is less even and comprehensive than the Zagoria volume. Comprised of papers and discussions presented at a symposium held in the early summer 1966 at the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, *Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Dispute* does not, indeed, make any claim to comprehensiveness; rather, it tries to offer, in the words of one of its editors some "essays in curiosity" and "exercises in documentation." In general, it succeeds to a greater extent on the second count than on the first. Among other papers, the reader should find P. J. Honey's on "North Vietnam's Model of Strategy and Tactics for Revolution" (*i.e.* the theory and practice of "People's War") particularly enlightening. He will also find William B. Ballis' account of "Relations Between the USSR and Vietnam" informative, even if somewhat out of date. On the other hand, Bernhard Grossmann's speculations about the influence of the Vietnam war on the economy of Communist China will doubtless strike even half-knowledgeable readers as highly tentative and now largely irrelevant in view of the ravages apparently inflicted on mainland China's economy by the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." But perhaps the most disappointing part of the Rupen-Farrell volume is the discussion section. In his conclusion, Mr. Rupen speaks of a "consensus" of opinion and it is precisely in the specifics of this consensus that one finds much with which to quarrel by way of unexamined assumptions and unsubstantiated conclusions.

DONALD ZAGORIA'S BOOK is another matter. After forthrightly presenting his own position on controversial policy issues, Zagoria proceeds to describe the "triangular relationship" between Mos-

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cow, Peking, and Hanoi, devoting three separate chapters to a detailed exploration of each protagonist's position before offering his own conclusions. All this is followed by three short appendices offering a chronological account of Sino-Soviet relations since the fall of Khrushchev, a recapitulation of proposals for negotiations on Vietnam, and, finally, some charts of North Vietnamese organizational structures. A good half of the final section of the book is given over to documents.

Although much of Professor Zagoria's analysis is highly persuasive, his overall treatment is a bit disjointed. The chapter on Soviet policy, which at Mr. Zagoria's request was originally drafted by another writer, does not easily link up with the chapter on Chinese policy, curiously titled "Peking's Doves, Hawks, and Dawks," which was prepared by Mr. Zagoria himself for another purpose. It is in the latter chapter that the author makes his case—by now a familiar one from his pen—for the usefulness of "Pekinology," *i.e.* the Sinified version of those cryptological techniques originally applied to the study of Soviet politics, and still referred to as "Kremlinology." Relying on this particular method —for we really have no other—Zagoria reasons that the Maoist position on Vietnam has been a centrist one and that both the right (military and Hawk) and the left (revisionist and Dove) opposition within China have for different reasons favored a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. It may be so. Or again it may not be. One ought to be chastened by some sense of the potential pitfalls of Pekinology, or at the very least, one ought to lament the absence of the kind of hard evidence which, if available, would make for a more secure analysis of this sort of contemporary history.

Such observations aside, it should be said that the single greatest service of Zagoria's book lies in its dissection of the divergent interests at play in Vietnam on the Communist side— if, indeed, one can even speak of a single Communist "side." Considering Vietnam alone, Zagoria marshals considerable evidence to support the contention that while the National Liberation Front is "Hanoi's creature, it has developed a personality and vitality of its own and cannot now be dismissed as a mere Northern puppet." As he sees it, although both Hanoi and the NLF would like to oust the United States from South Vietnam, the former seems bent on national reunification under its own aegis but the latter may well be more inclined toward a separate government in South Vietnam—under its own influence, and still free from North Vietnamese control.

For its part, China views the war as a chance to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the United States, possibly even to precipitate an apocalyptic showdown between the two nuclear superpowers; or at bare minimum, as an opportunity to embarrass the Soviet Union and thus to put the brakes on its detente with the United States. Communist China's ulterior motives have certainly not been lost upon the Soviet leadership. In its turn, Moscow has sought to exploit China's attitude toward the Vietnam war in order to isolate Peking in the international Communist movement. And while the Soviet Union has obviously not shared China's aspirations, neither has it fully endorsed those of Hanoi, whose militance in behalf of its own cause has eluded effective moderation by the Soviet Union, at least so far.

In his discussion of all these divergent Communist interests, Prof. Zagoria is at his most persuasive, though the reader may dissent from one or another of the inferences that he draws. For example, one may well question how "hard" Moscow has been "working to promote a compromise settlement in [Vietnam] that falls short of both Chinese and American optimal goals, but which is acceptable to Hanoi" (p. 127). In this reviewer's opinion, Zagoria convincingly delineates the dilemmas posed for the Soviet Union by the Vietnam war, but he also underestimates the political advantages that Moscow still hopes to reap from the conflict, not least of all by way of a diminished US role in Europe.

All told, as Zagoria's own account should make abundantly clear, international relationships in and concerning Vietnam are much more complicated than the nice, concise title, *Vietnam Triangle*, suggests. Therein lies the difficulty, for the present, of writing anything like a definitive analysis of Vietnam's impact on international Communist politics and, need one add, in finding an equitable solution to the war itself.

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Generals and the General Line

ROMAN KOLKOWICZ: *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party.*
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967.

Reviewed by Malcolm Mackintosh

THERE CAN BE NO doubt that the problem which Roman Kolkowicz has tackled in this massive, thorough and extremely valuable book is one which troubles all dictatorial party regimes that draw their authority from a political doctrine, yet in the long run rely upon armed force to uphold their power in the state and in the outside world. How do you strike the correct balance between military efficiency and political loyalty? How do you ensure that your best soldiers are also your most convinced devotees of the party?

Mr. Kolkowicz has tapped every available source on this problem as it relates to the Soviet Union, and has come up with a unique study. It is not just a history of army-party relations, for the author reflects at some length on the place of the professional soldier in 20th-century society, and applies this and his knowledge of Russian history to add weight to his argument. Basically, however, his study is a detailed examination of the interests and requirements of two of the main elements of power in the Soviet Union—the Communist Party and the armed forces—and of the influence of the two protagonists upon each other and upon the policy of the Soviet state.

After a historical explanation of the issues involved in army-party relations, and the mechanics of the party's control system in the armed forces, Mr. Kolkowicz develops his argument by examining four case histories. First, the case history of professional autonomy—that is, the right of the professional military leadership to work out its military doctrine, make known its requirements in the field of armaments and organizations, and be free of political work which interferes with military training. Here the author traces the role of Marshal Zhukov in staking out the military's claims, and the part that this played in his downfall in 1957.

The second case concerns the unexpectedly important role played in the army-party confrontation by military history, which, as the author puts it, "has become a forum for claims, grievances and demands." In claiming credit for various victories (and disclaiming responsibility for defeats) in World War II, the marshals, generals and admirals have not only boosted their own importance, but played down that of the Communist Party. The issue, however, became much more complicated when one party leader, Nikita Khrushchev, used his participation in a single battle, the defense of Stalingrad, to manufacture a military reputation for himself, and to upgrade the contribution of Stalingrad to the final victory over Germany. In so doing, he increased the reputation of the marshals and generals who fought at Stalingrad, and laid the foundations for forming a group of military leaders under his patronage from whom he hoped to exact political as well as personal loyalty.

The concept of a group of "personal" supporters within the military establishment—of a faction designed to strengthen the position of its patron within the party and government and at the same time introduce additional party control, as it were, through a side door—is so important that Mr. Kol-

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kowicz rightly devotes a chapter to the rise of Khrushchev's Stalingrad group. He is cautious in his methodology, and explains the criteria for "membership" in the Stalingrad group (pp. 278-281): a combination of joint service at the battle of Stalingrad, or service in the Ukraine during or after the war; common interests and views; and common antagonists. These factors enable Khrushchev to weld together a group of leading military figures, who, under his leadership, were in control of the Soviet armed forces from at least 1957 to 1964.

It was a promising maneuver, but, as Mr. Kolkowicz shows in his next case history, it failed. It failed because Khrushchev expected too much of the Stalingrad group: he demanded their support for a military doctrine of which they disapproved (although some of them tried to make it work), and he expected them to put up with, and even applaud, his erratic and often ill-judged interventions in military affairs—even in the technical field. When the crisis came in 1964, his chosen group of military leaders stood aside and allowed Brezhnev, Kosygin and their colleagues to remove their patron. Loyalty to their profession overcame loyalty to a political leader, however great his services to them may have been.

FINALLY, MR. KOLKOWICZ explains the current phase of the 50-year old army-party relationship. The three most important elements today and in the future are seen to be the role of the technical specialist in armed forces equipped with missiles and computers, the apparent abandonment by Khrushchev's successors of the concept of a "personal group" among the military, and a tendency toward less party control over strictly military matters than was the case under Stalin and Khrushchev. Of particular interest is the emergence of the military technocrat, whose loyalty to his profession has none of the heroic attributes of the front-line soldier on which the army's nationwide popularity was based in the past. Yet the technocrat is as opposed to political interference as were the heroes of World War II. Mr. Kolkowicz concludes that much will depend on whether the party can come to terms with a new-style military-technological leadership, and he believes, probably correctly, that this is within the reach of Soviet society as it is now developing.

It is difficult to do full justice to a study of this scope and detail, to its valuable appendices where illuminating examples of the working of army-party relations are to be found, or to its admirable references. This reviewer would, however, enter one note of caution. In his description of the Stalingrad group, Mr. Kolkowicz has cast his net too wide. It is inaccurate to classify Marshal Konev, who fought on the Western Front in 1941-43, and only served on a front neighboring Khrushchev's for six months in 1943, as a "Stalingrader": Konev had ample reason to oppose Zhukov, and lent himself to Khrushchev for this purpose, but his is a very special case which is difficult to fit into the Stalingrad framework. The listing of General I. I. Fediuninski as a member of the Stalingrad group (p. 364) also seems to stretch the group too far: apart from commanding a corps in the Ukraine before and at the very beginning of the war, Fediuninski served in Leningrad (1941-44), the Baltic, Poland and North Germany (1944-45), and none of his postwar commands coincided with Khrushchev's work in the Ukraine or in Moscow. But these are small points. The important fact is that the concept of a personal group was tried and found wanting by Khrushchev when he needed it most. It may not be relied upon in the same way again.

Mr. Kolkowicz has produced a notable work of scholarship which throws new and valuable light on a most important aspect of Soviet society, and should become the standard work for all students of the subject.

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Reviews in Brief

Master Spy

F. W. Deakin and G. R. Storry: *The Case of Richard Sorge,* New York, Harper & Row, 1966.

IN THE FIELD of espionage, Richard Sorge is perhaps the best illustration of Oscar Wilde's dictum that "nature imitates art." Handsome, clever, attractive, dedicated, unflappable, even hard-drinking and philandering—Sorge was all of these, a James Bond with a brain! He also would probably have been shot by his employers if they could have gotten their hands on him in 1938. And as a final irony (and a good spy story must finally be ironic), his employers, or at least his employer in chief, failed to heed his most vital messages. Stalin refused to believe Sorge's reports which specified, well in advance, the date of Nazi Germany's June 1941 attack on the Soviet Union.

Add to these ingredients another almost unique quality of the affair—namely, the fact that Sorge's mission to Japan is about the best-documented history of a Soviet spy ring in the public domain—and it is easy to understand why the affair has been such a popular subject for books about espionage—at least until the present study came along. For F. W. Deakin and G. R. Storry appear to have written the definitive account, and until the archives of the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces are opened, little more is likely to be added to it. The book is so obviously superior to the previous accounts that there is little more to say of it as a book except that, if you want to know about Sorge, read this one.

And Sorge is worth knowing about. For almost any aspect of the study of communism and the Soviet Union, the Sorge case is informative. Clandestine operations are a field rarely investigated by the scholar; yet conspiracy is one of the most persistent features of Soviet history and, as the Sorge case illustrates, of Communist parties as well. In organizing Sorge's ring, Soviet intelligence drew recruits from at least six different Communist parties. No other intelligence service could reach out to grab a Serb in Paris, a German in Germany, a Japanese in California, and another Japanese in China (through the intermediary of an American). The Communist International and its successors may have had shortcomings as political instruments, but they have had no equal as a school for prospective spies. No wonder that the ban on using party members as Soviet intelligence agents, put into effect as a consequence of the Canadian and US "atom spy" cases, was rescinded in 1960.

As for the relevance of the Sorge affair to Soviet history, it serves, first of all, to point up the simple fact that the Communist rulers of an impoverished country were fully prepared to expend the money and effort necessary to organize a clandestine *apparat* capable of deploying not just the Sorge ring but hundreds of others as well. Secondly, the climate of suspicion and intrigue that enveloped the Soviet Union in the 1930's finds no better illustration than in the depredations visited on an able intelligence service by the *Yezhovshchina* and the dubiety with which such valuable and authoritative information as Sorge's was apparently received in Moscow. Thirdly, the Sorge case suggests that the Soviet intelligence cadres of those earlier days—the 1920's and 1930's—were talented and dedicated to a degree that their successors, at least so far as we know of them, have not equalled. Compare Sorge, an astute and perceptive political analyst, an accomplished journalist and scholar, with a simpering cad such as Gordon Lonsdale (Molody) reveals himself to be in his book, *Spy: Twenty Years in Soviet Secret Service* (New York, Hawthorn Books, 1965; reviewed in *Problems of Communism,* No. 4, 1966, pp. 55-56). Sorge believed in communism as the way to salvation, even though he apparently had his moments of doubt. These days the idealists are more likely to be found on the other side.

One important and seldom-considered aspect of Soviet clandestine operations that emerges from the Deakin-Storry study centers on the role of the Soviet intelligence agent. The Soviet intelligence services have never considered the function of their agents to be confined simply to the passive gathering of information; they are also there to act. Sorge's influence may not have been sufficient to prevent the signing of the German-Japanese-Italian Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936, but as he himself reported, "I did what I could to influence [German] Ambassador von Dirksen and Colonel Ott [then German Military Attache in Tokyo] against it." Of infinitely greater concern to the Soviet Union was the question of the direction which Japanese aggression might take in 1941. Japan's expansionists were torn between two choices: to move southward towards Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, ultimately challenging England and the United States; or to move north, seizing Siberia from the Soviet Union while the German advance into Russia was at full flood. Students

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of international relations might well consider the following statement by the Japanese security official who interrogated Sorge's most important Japanese agent, Hotsumi Ozaki:

Sorge's special relationship to Ambassador Ott [Ott succeeded von Dirksen], Ozaki's ties with Prime Minister Konoye and others, the social positions of the defendants, and similar considerations made it reasonable to suspect them of having engaged in political activities; and during the course of our investigation we found ample justification for such a suspicion, both Sorge and Ozaki confessing that following the outbreak of the Russo-German war, when a northward thrust [by Japan] had seemed imminent, they had started a political movement aimed at diverting Japan's energies southward against England and the United States.

By the time we investigated this political plot angle, however, the Pacific War had started, and we were afraid to delve too deeply into it, lest, by proving that the war was provoked by the Communists, we invite internal conflict. We deliberately refrained from making a thorough investigation, and in consequence the statements of the defendants on the point were far from conclusive.

Can we assume that such tactics have been foresworn today?

James McKee

The Soviet Elite

GEORGE W. SIMONDS, ED.: *Soviet Leaders*, New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967.

ANYONE ATTEMPTING to assemble biographies of the "forty-two most influential figures in contemporary Soviet society" faces a most difficult task. It is not a question of number—forty-two is as good a figure as any—but how do you make the selection? And once you have chosen, how do you go about compiling the biographies?

The editor of *Soviet Leaders* solves the first problem with relative ease by grouping his VIPs into six categories: party, government and law; military; foreign service; economic theory and practice; science and philosophy; and the arts. Thus the selection is to be judged within each grouping. For it is obvious that the overall influence of, say, Kosygin is not of quite th esame nature as that of, say, Ernst Neizvestny, a controversial avant-garde sculptor little known outside the intellectual elite of Moscow and Leningrad. One also suspects that a Soviet scholar compiling a similar list would have left out a number of Professor Simonds' choices and included other men, less publicized in the West but more influential in Soviet circles.

Much more important is the problem of sources for such biographies. The contributors to *Soviet Leaders*, many of them prominent experts in Soviet area studies, had extremely little to go on because Soviet encyclopedias contain notoriously little personal information about leading Soviet personalities; most of what we know about them comes from painstaking piecing together of facts (and often, unfortunately, of non-facts) fished out of every available Soviet publication. This is not enough for an astute biographer, and it is not at all surprising that most of the resulting 42 portraits are rather flat. If someone in Moscow tried to write a biography of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the basis of *Who's Who*, a few clippings from *The New York Times*, and the texts of several speeches the General had delivered to West Point cadets or to conventions of the Junior Chamber of Commerce, the result would be much the same.

None of the foregoing is intended to deny the usefulness of the project; to know something about top men in Soviet society is better than to know nothing. Moreover, as we read about party, government, and military leaders, we cannot fail to be impressed by the extraordinary similarity of their careers: peasant backgrounds, advancement through the party or the Komsomol, and, in many cases, sudden moves up to the highest levels during the Great Purges of the 1930's, moves suggestive of the heroes' close cooperation with the NKVD. Few of those currently at the top, even those who joined the Central Committee of the CPSU during Stalin's life, were proteges of Stalin himself. A remarkable number seem to owe their promotions to Khrushchev. Nowhere do we learn what caused them to turn against their benefactor, but the fact that they did so successfully testifies to their political agility. On the whole, one gets the impression that there is much more continuity in the Soviet leadership, and that the transfer of power is more orderly, than is generally assumed.

Some of the biographies offer a great deal more than a glimpse of the subject. In the portraits of Mikoyan, Suslov, Malinovski, Gromyko, or Kuznetsov, the respective authors succeed in painting a broad background to each man's career, wisely focusing on each one's role in the developments which have been part of the drama of Soviet political and military history.

Somewhat regrettable—and annoying—is the insistence of some contributors (and of the editor) on classifying various personages as "conservatives" and "liberals." Aside from being frequently little more than value judgments, such definitions assume the consistency of "good" intentions on the part of the one group of Soviet leaders and wicked ones on the part of the others. By this token, for instance, the late Lavrenti Beria, who presumably advocated decentralization of power in the Soviet empire in the post-Stalin days and who was executed for it by the so-called "liberals," led by Khrushchev, would himself have to be classified as a "liberal." For that matter, what label are we to affix to Khrushchev, whose tenure was characterized by shifts from Stalin-like repressions (*e.g.*, the anti-intellectual campaign of 1962-63) to Bukharin-like pronouncements (goulash vs. guns)? Clearly, labels are often no more than shortcuts to obfuscation.

Vladimir Petrov

Revolution and Diplomacy

XENIA JOUKOFF EUDIN AND ROBERT M. SLUSSER: *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-1934. Documents and Materials*, Vol. 1. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1966.

THE PERIOD 1928-1934 witnessed significant changes in Soviet Russia's foreign relationships. At the outset Stalin, secure in his newly-won dictatorial power and already embarked on prodigious programs of industrialization and collectivization at home, seemed almost to eschew foreign policy in favor of a peculiarly Soviet version

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of splendid isolation. Symptomatic of this was the radical shift to the left, sanctified by the Sixth Comintern Congress in May 1928. Despite the pseudo-revolutionary fanfare with which it was accompanied, the shift primarily sought to tie foreign Communist parties more closely to the Soviet Union, to make their leaders and apparatuses subservient to Stalin personally, and, in the last analysis, to isolate foreign Communist parties from the non-Communist left. Six years later, however, Soviet perspectives were radically altered. The consolidation of an aggressive, avowedly anti-Soviet Nazi regime in Germany and the expansiveness of militaristic Japan had ineluctably drawn the Soviet Union back into international politics, and had rendered most of Stalin's earlier isolationist calculations invalid in the process.

The volume under review addresses itself to this complex period (or, more accurately, to the years 1928-1931: a second volume covering 1932-1934 was published in October 1967). It is offered as a continuation of the two previous Hoover Institution collections, *Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927* and *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927*, also compiled by X. J. Eudin with several collaborators. Like its predecessors, the present volume consists chiefly of documents selected "to present the most important points of the Soviet Communists' own evaluation of their foreign policies and their general interpretation of the world situation." A narrative summary and analysis, meant to frame the entire offering of documents and materials, is quite brief and rather sketchy, given the intricacies of the period. Still, the documents often speak quite forcefully for themselves, conveying, for example, the Soviet contempt for bourgeois pacifism, or the sharpness (and erroneousness) of the Communist indictment of Social Democracy as "Social Fascism," or else the muted eloquence of Bukharin trying to rationalize the Comintern's failures in China.

At a time when collections of documents concerning Soviet and/or Communist affairs have become all the rage —at least with publishers—there is some danger that the present volume may not receive the attention it deserves. This is all the more likely because there are already two exemplary collections which cover the same period —*Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* and *The Communist International, 1919-1943, Documents*, both expertly selected, edited, and analyzed by Jane Degras, and published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Let it therefore be said that Eudin and Slusser's claim to have avoided duplicating material already published in English is well substantiated. Their volume is especially rich in highly relevant and informative material gleaned from the Soviet press and Comintern commentaries of the period, material that is often not readily accessible in the original, much less in English translation. As such, the Eudin and Slusser collection can be used with great profit in conjunction with the Degras volumes which, it might be noted, tend to favor strictly official documents—manifestoes, theses, communiquès, diplomatic notes and the like. In sum, then, the volume under review includes a unique collection of documents and materials, meant principally for specialists, but of real value precisely for that reason.

Melvin Croan

Africa and China

EMMANUEL JOHN HEVI: *The Dragon's Embrace: The Chinese Communists in Africa.* New York, F. A. Praeger, 1966.

MR. HEVI IS A Ghanaian who in 1960 went to Peking on a Ghana government scholarship to study medicine. He stayed in China for about 18 months. In 1962, his growing antagonism to the Nkrumah regime drove him into voluntary exile in Nigeria, where he remained until Nkrumah's overthrow. His disillusionment with Marxism and the China of Mao Tse-tung was described in his first book, *An African Student in China*, published in 1964. *The Dragon's Embrace*, a slender, emotionally-charged volume is, as the author puts it in his preface, primarily addressed to his fellow Africans, whose preoccupation with colonialism and imperialism tends to be somewhat one-sided:

For a long time to come, we in Africa will still have cause to denounce the imperialists, even if some of us do so merely to draw attention away from our domestic failures. But we need some realism. If any imperialism is dangerous to us, then *all* imperialists are dangerous to us. And if we must have allies, these certainly should not be the confirmed imperialists in Moscow, Peking, and Havana.

These sentiments set the theme for a blunt and severe exposé of Communist China's expansionist designs and actions in Asia (Chapter 1), her views on revolutionary upheaval and national liberation in Africa (Chapters 2 and 3), and her interference in the internal affairs of African nations. The argument unfolds rapidly and bluntly, without too much preoccupation with semantic refinements (Daniil Solod "found Touré's boot applied squarely to his backside"), and with a cheerful flouting of Western, Eastern, and African sensibilities and ideological prejudices. It is a youthful book, addressed to a youthful elite on a proud and impatient continent. It says much that certainly needs saying about big power hypocrisy and African self-delusion; it is ruthless about what it considers harmful myths of an African heritage of unsullied greatness and the alleged total and unredeeming evil of the old colonialists; it is skeptical of all kinds of "Greeks" bearing gifts, especially those who pretend to know what is best for Africa, among whom the Chinese Communists are the worst offenders. Without dismissing the usefulness of foreign models, the author argues for greater reliance on Africa's own experimentations:

From each ideological hemisphere, Africa can find something good to borrow. With these borrowings, blended with the moral and ethical principles that marked the African way of life before the white men came, we can develop political systems that will serve our particular needs and aspirations.

Essentially, *The Dragon's Embrace* is a declaration of faith in Africa's ability to build a future for itself by skirting the dangers of Communist totalitarianism and refusing to be the "pawn in an international power game." The temptation to censure its youthful ardor and occasional *non sequitur*, to shrug off much of the argument as generally known and not terribly deep, must be resisted as missing the point. And the point is that *The Dragon's Embrace* is addressed to an audience in which national emotions and old grudges run high and which is only slowly becoming aware that the new imperialisms of the Communist East are a worse poison for Africa's aspirations than the old and

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ailing colonialism of the West. As a clear-sighted *parti pris* for Africa (the contradiction in terms is less real than apparent), the book is worth reading.

Jan S. Prybyla

The Thoughts of Ho Chi Minh

BERNARD B. FALL, ED.: *Ho Chi Minh on Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920-1966,* New York, F. A. Praeger, 1967.

SINCE HO CHI MINH, the most elusive mystery man of Asian communism, has been the object of such strong passions, both of admiration and of hate, and since everyone today is deeply concerned about the course of the war in Vietnam and wondering whether the leaders in Hanoi will ever be inclined to negotiate, an extraordinary degree of interest attaches to this volume of Ho's writings, which Bernard Fall completed editing just one week before his tragic death in South Vietnam.

It is, therefore, a shock to discover that the book is without question the dreariest and most depressing in many a year. It is disturbing above all to learn that the heroic sacrifices of the Vietnamese Communists have been inspired in large part by what can only be described as an endless stream of banalities. When at last we are confronted with a substantial collection of Ho's words, the mystery of why he has not appeared more in public evaporates—his public style is that of a simpleton. His words lack intellectual vigor; they are devoid of passion; his phrases are clumsy and wooden; and it is all so trivial and trite. To a distressing degree, Ho's writings consist of nothing more than those forms of pompous "greetings," ceremonial commemorations, and routine openings of institutes and schools, which are expected to be boring in all societies, and which are especially so in Communist ones.

This book regrettably sheds little light on the issue of whether Ho is more the nationalist or the Communist; he doesn't seem to be much of either. It has been said that Ho was above all inspired by a passionate hatred of French colonialism. Yet in these pages he seems to be only a complaining man, one who is writing to the newspapers about, say, his frustrations with the services of the telephone company. At other times he makes such extreme statements about the personal wickedness of particular French officials that he seems to be begging the intelligent reader not to take him seriously.

The reports that Ho Chi Minh is not much of a theoretician are certainly substantiated by his writings, which at best make him appear to be just another party hack. He explains very little and relies heavily upon clichés for effect. For example, the French suddenly disappear as the main enemy and are replaced by the abstraction called "American imperialism." About the government and leaders in South Vietnam, almost nothing is said beyond routine propaganda phrases.

Maybe it is wrong to expect much in the writings of a revolutionary leader. Yet for all the inhibiting qualities of Marxian ideological writing, Mao Tse-tung repeatedly finds the vivid phrase, Khrushchev had his earthy style, and, above all of course, both Lenin and Stalin had their distinctive ideas and qualities. With Ho Chi Minh, however, we have the impression of a leader who is incapable of rising above the routine level of the day-to-day party propagandist. Could it be that his mind contains no more than these banalities? This is probably why the book is so peculiarly depressing.

Lucian W. Pye

A Prisoner in Hungary

Black Nightshade. The Hungarian Prison Memoirs of Rose Vali. Narrated in English by Theresa de Kerpely. New York, William Morrow, 1965.

TRUE TO THE objective morality of Christianity, the damned in Dante's *Inferno* have already condemned themselves well before death. Having no real function, Minos, the judge of this underworld, seems slightly redundant: he acts only as a kind of infernal traffic cop pointing to the place of eternal punishment instead of pronouncing sentence.

On the other hand, true to the subjective morality of "people's democracy," the damned in Rose Vali's hell were condemned well before they had even had time to commit the crimes they were accused of. And the Minos of this particular Inferno, disguised as a lieutenant of the AVH (Hungarian security police), had a very real function to perform: his task was to find out whether the people sent to him were fully aware of the sins they had *not* committed, and to judge them accordingly.

This is but one difference, albeit a revealing one, between medieval image and modern reality. Furthermore, if Dante's Inferno was a colorful place despite its horrors, Rose Vali's hell, perhaps because of them, was just "a drab, official hell, in which Satan had been deposed as too romantic and had been replaced by an Executive Committee of Eternally Damned Bureaucrats from the Ministry of the Absurd."

It is against the background of the drabness and unreality of Stalinist Hungary that we witness the descent—the triumphs and humiliations—of Rose Vali, a brave, intelligent and warmhearted woman who defied "the logic of absurdity" by simply remaining committed to the logic of Christian love. Arrested together with her husband, Ferenc A. Vali, in July 1951 for "plotting to escape to the West," she remained in prison until September 1954, when she was freed by the first government of Imre Nagy. She records her experiences in prison with a simplicity and warmth that transcend her humiliations and give meaning to the meaninglessness of suffering. Her story is a moving study not only of personal self-examination, but also of the nature and impact of diverse human relationships.

Projected on the screen of her memory, fellow-prisoners, wardens, interrogators, parents, friends, and relatives appear, if only to bring into sharper relief the central figure in her memoirs. It is touching that this figure is not the author herself but her husband, loved and remembered throughout the years of imprisonment, without sentimentality yet with the force of overwhelming emotion. It is here that the book rises above the ordinary *déjà vu* and, by fusing experience and memory, past and present, into the unity of love, becomes a remarkable achievement.

By a happy coincidence, Rose Vali found Theresa de Kerpely to narrate her story in English. Out of their cooperation, but thanks largely to Mrs. de Kerpely's highly sensitive and extraordinary self-identification with the protagonist, the book emerges stylish, elegant and forceful.

Tamas Aczel

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The Nazi-Soviet Pact:

A Missing Page in Soviet Historiography

By Vladimir Petrov

Western historians seem to have lost interest in the Nazi-Soviet collaboration of 1939-41. A few analytical studies did appear after the publication in 1948 of the related German documents, but on the whole the subject has been sadly neglected.[1]

This Western reluctance to examine the antecedents of the "Great Patriotic War" is in a sharp contrast to the almost pathological obsession with the subject in the Soviet Union. Until recently, some Soviet studies even ventured to probe into the origins of the war and its early, disastrous period. Military analysts discarded as clearly inadequate the old Stalinist explanation that the staggering victories scored by the German army in 1941-42 were due solely to the suddenness of Hitler's attack. They delved into the lack of military preparedness, the weaknesses in strategic planning, and even the errors of political judgment responsible for the early calamities.

The Soviet military establishment has of course been eager to clear its record. But the privilege of fixing ultimate responsibility for failures rests with the party alone, and the only shortcoming the party has permitted to be charged against Stalin on this score is a certain measure of pigheadedness in not heeding proffered evidence of an impending German invasion. Further explanations for the catastrophe of 1941 have not been forthcoming for two reasons: first, deeper probing into Stalin's "errors" would involve a reappraisal of top policy, and second, the party cannot afford to throw Stalin to the wolves without at the same time abandoning the dogma of the infallibility of the leadership as a whole. Consequently, Soviet

[1] Among the published works are Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies* (New York, Macmillan, 1953); Amilcare Rossi, *The Russo-German Alliance, August 1939-June 1941* (London, Chapman, 1950); and Gerhard L. Weinberg, *Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941* (Leiden, Brill, 1954).

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historians are allowed to reveal isolated bits of information but are barred from piecing together a comprehensive picture.

The Background

A thorough examination of the Nazi-Soviet Pact probably should begin with Bismarck's policy of alliance with Russia. Equally useful for an understanding of the pact would be a study of the deep, almost emotional attachment of Russian Marxists to Germany and German political thought, of Lenin's "defeatism" in World War I and his position on the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. But perhaps most relevant of all would be a review of the story of Rapallo, this marriage of convenience of two states painfully humbled in the war, both treated as international outcasts, both victims of Anglo-French military interventions, both objects of the systems of alliance and *cordons sanitaires*.

Soviet-German collaboration—at least in the military sphere—continued until the proclamation of the Third Reich in 1933, which seemed to introduce a radically new element into the relations between the two powers. No convincing evidence exists that Stalin and his colleagues were ever genuinely troubled by the declared anticommunism of the Third Reich. Their cynicism about their own propaganda predisposed them to be equally cynical about Nazi propaganda, to dismiss much of Hitler's oratory as mere lip service to his ideology, and to look, instead, for "hidden messages" expressing his actual aims and desires. There is no doubt, therefore, that Stalin took seriously Hitler's speech of March 23, 1933, in which the Führer voiced his wish "to cultivate friendly relations" with the Soviet Union, indirectly assuring the latter that "the fight against communism in Germany is our internal affair" and that "international political relations with other countries to whom important common interests tie us are not affected by it." It is in this context that one must judge Stalin's speech at the 17th Congress of the CPSU in 1934, with its astounding assertion that while "we are far from enthusiastic about the fascist regime in Germany . . . fascism is beside the point, if only because fascism in Italy, for example, has not kept the USSR from establishing the best of relations with that country." [2]

The emergence of the Soviet Union from isolation and its entry into the League of Nations in the fall of 1934 are generally ascribed to Soviet fear of German—and Japanese—militarism. Yet it is doubtful that Stalin expected the League to become an effective peace-keeping body. Aware, however, that the Soviet image had been badly marred by the ongoing purges, he hoped to improve it by an apparently firm anti-Nazi stance.

The political polarization in the mid-1930's did not involve Germany and the Soviet Union in any direct conflict anywhere, and hence the Soviet leaders had little incentive for reassessing their long-range view of Germany. Although the negotiations being conducted by Stalin's emissaries in Berlin were shrouded in secrecy, they were nonetheless noted by foreign observers, among them the American Chargé d'Affaires in Germany.[3] In August, 1936, the US Consul in Geneva also informed the State Department that talks between Germany and Russia were in progress,[4] and in September of that year the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs told the American Minister for the Baltic states that he believed it possible that Germany and the Soviet Union would reach an agreement.[5]

The Soviet leaders may quite possibly have been seriously worried by the display of great-power cooperation in Munich, and Hitler for his part clearly was not satisfied with the results of the Munich conference. Czechoslovakia, having lost the Sudetenland, was falling apart, thus presenting the Führer with still another temptation. There was lively Nazi agitation in and about Danzig, and as of the autumn of 1938, all signs pointed to Poland as the next target of Hitler's offensive.

The Soviet leadership had to pause and revise its strategy. Merely to sit on the sidelines was too dangerous. Any further aggrandizement by Germany with the tacit consent of Great Britain and France might lead to the total isolation of the Soviet Union. To forestall such a development, it was necessary to provoke a crisis aimed at invalidating the accomplishments of Munich and showing how ephemeral was "peace in our time."

On March 10, 1939, addressing the 18th Party Congress, Stalin hinted that Germany could count on Soviet understanding. Von der Schulenburg, the German Ambassador in Moscow, stressed in his report to

[2] For Hitler's speech, see Hilger & Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 262. Stalin's speech at the 17th Congress is quoted by Robert C. Tucker in his introduction to *The Great Purge Trial*, a reprint of the stenographic report of the March 1938 trial of Bukharin *et al.* (edited by Robert C. Tucker and Stephen F. Cohen, New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1965, p. xxxv).

[3] Ferdinand L. Mayer to Arthur Bliss Lane, in the Arthur Bliss Lane Collection, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

[4] Prentiss B. Gilbert to the Department of State, in State Department Files, The National Archives, Washington, DC.

[5] Lane to Mayer, September 21, 1936, Arthur Bliss Lane Collection.

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Berlin that in this speech, "Stalin's irony and criticism were directed in a considerably sharper degree against Britain, *i.e.*, against the reactionary forces in power there, than against the so-called aggressor states and, in particular, Germany." [6] That this speech was intended as a signal to Berlin was confirmed several months later by Molotov himself, who "raised his glass to Stalin, remarking that it had been Stalin who—through his speech of March of this year, which had been well understood in Germany—had introduced the reversal in political relations." [7]

Whether by coincidence or not, within one week after Stalin's speech Hitler declared Slovakia independent and annexed the remaining Czech lands. In response, Chamberlain and Daladier extended "guarantees" to Poland, Rumania, and Greece. By the end of March, the spirit of Munich had evaporated and Europe found itself sharply divided into two implacably hostile camps.

Theoretically, the falling out of the Munich powers gave Stalin a choice. He could either come to terms with Hitler, or he could approach Great Britain and France and join in an effort to contain the Axis. In practical terms, however, the latter alternative was unsatisfactory, for it implied obligations without corresponding benefits. Chamberlain kept insisting that British policy was "not a policy of lining up opposing blocks of power in Europe, animated by hostile intentions toward one another, and accepting the view that war is inevitable . . . We are trying to build up not an alliance between ourselves and other countries, but a peace front against aggression." [8]

The question remains whether Stalin could have considered a third possibility, namely, a full-fledged alliance with Great Britain and France, accompanied by recognition of the Soviet Union as a great power entitled to a sphere of influence and to territorial expansion at the expense of its western neighbors. That much, at least, Molotov said or hinted at in Moscow to the French and British representatives later that summer. The critics of appeasement, from Churchill down, have since blamed Chamberlain and Daladier for not exploring this possibility.

Yet it appears doubtful that such a choice in fact existed. To Stalin and his entourage, the principal enemy had always been the democratic West, with its distasteful self-righteousness and its hostility to the Russian Revolution. Although Hitler, too, was an avowed anti-Communist, his virulent hostility toward the Versailles system, combined with his growing trouble-making potential, induced Stalin to regard him, on balance, as an asset in the arsenal of Soviet diplomacy. By the late spring of 1939, Stalin knew that Hitler intended to attack Poland, and he could reasonably expect that if the attack occurred, London and Paris would honor their treaty obligations. It is simply difficult to believe that Moscow failed to see that after the fall of Prague all avenues to Germany's conciliation with the West were closed. For it was precisely this situation which permitted Stalin to encourage Hitler to take the irrevocable step and launch a war which to the Soviet leader, sitting as it were on the sidelines, seemed clearly preferable to the "peace front against aggression" envisioned by Chamberlain.

An Uneasy Partnership

The story of the Soviet-German negotiations that culminated in the Nazi-Soviet Pact has been told many times. Here let us note only that, thanks to the Soviet ability to sit tight, Hitler became so desperate, in view of his scheduled attack on Poland, that he literally begged Stalin to accept Ribbentrop's mission—and a good part of the expected spoils. The terms of the agreement (as recorded in the Secret Protocol to the Pact) met all Stalin's demands.

All the evidence at our disposal indicates that the deal was entered into by both sides in good faith. If at that time Hitler nourished the idea of eventually attacking Russia, no proof of it is to be found in the innumerable German documents and memoirs published since the war. Nor is there reason to believe that Stalin had any reservations about the deal. The speed with which it was concluded had no precedent in modern diplomacy, and Stalin's assurances to Ribbentrop that the Soviet Government took the new pact "very seriously" and that he "could guarantee on his word of honor that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner" carried a note of unmistakable sincerity.

Perhaps even more convincing was the trade agreement signed in February 1940, which grew out of the

[6] Schulenburg to the Foreign Ministry, March 13, 1939, US Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945* (referred to hereafter as *DGFP*), Series D (1937-45), Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1953, Vol. VI, pp. 1-3.

[7] *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, p. 228. Apparently more decisive to Hitler was the second "signal"—the dismissal of Litvinov on May 3, 1939, which effectively put an end to the Soviet political negotiations with the British and French. See Hitler's speech to the Commanders-in-Chief on August 22, 1939, *ibid.*, p. 204. *Cf.* Hilger and Meyer; *op. cit.*, pp. 293-300.

[8] Quoted by L. B. Namier, *Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-1939*, London, Macmillan, 1948, pp. 167-68.

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Soviet-German Boundary and Friendship Treaty concluded during Ribbentrop's second visit to Moscow. As the chairman of the German delegation recorded, the trade negotiations "were difficult" both for "material and psychological reasons. . . . The Soviet Union promised far more deliveries than are defensible from a purely economic point of view." And he observed that during the negotiations "the desire of the Soviet Government to help Germany and to consolidate firmly the political understanding in economic matters, too, became more and more evident." [9]

There were other indications of Soviet sincerity. After the signing of the Pact, all anti-Nazi remarks, even in closed party meetings, came to an end. Soviet citizens of German origin were voluntarily released from prisons and concentration camps. Anti-Nazi writings were removed from libraries and bookstores, and expressions of friendship for Germany (and of distaste for its "imperialistic" adversaries) began to be voiced *ad nauseam* by the Soviet press and radio.

Yet the Nazi-Soviet partnership did not survive, and the Moscow agreements did not lead to cordiality between the officials of the two governments. Early attempts by Stalin and Molotov to inject a note of intimacy into their relations with the Nazis were icily ignored. The Germans in Moscow were businesslike and exceedingly correct, but they preferred to talk across a desk. Soviet representatives in Berlin had no difficulty in getting appointments with top men in the various ministries, but they were never invited to intimate Nazi gatherings.

Furthermore, the objectives of the two partners remained distinctly different. Hitler wanted to win the war and gain the position of a leading world power for Germany. Stalin profited from German victories, but he considered his political and economic support of Germany an adequate contribution to the partnership. In his opinion, the Soviet Union could not lose, even if Germany were bled white in the war, or defeated altogether. The fall of France doubtless shook him, and for a while Soviet reserve gave way to new manifestations of loyalty to the partnership. Nevertheless, instead of prudently deferring to his triumphant partner, Stalin chose to assert his independence and, taking advantage of Germany's entanglement in the West, proceeded with the annexation of the Baltic states and Bessarabia.

Although Stalin stayed essentially within the letter of the agreements, this display of bullishness was a mistake. For Hitler, now at the pinnacle of his power, was not disposed to view this challenge with equanimity. In the fall of 1939 he had been willing to regard Stalin as an equal, and he had also been willing to swallow his annoyance later on when the Soviets attacked Finland. But in the summer of 1940, Hitler —the conqueror of the European Continent and the leader of the mightiest military machine ever assembled —no longer felt constrained to suppress his irritation. Some time in July, Hitler redefined Germany's interests in Southeastern Europe, extending them to all areas which had not been specifically assigned to the Soviet sphere. He also ordered his military strategists to start contingency planning for the conquest of Russia.

Apparently no one in Moscow understood the change in Hitler's mood. The Soviet leaders were experiencing the first sweet taste of territorial expansion. Their gains, so they believed, overshadowed Hitler's accomplishments in the West; they assumed that Germany needed Soviet support as before, and that at any rate Germany posed no serious threat. They knew for a fact that the German General Staff dreaded war on two fronts, and they were impressed with the British refusal to surrender.

On the basis of these assumptions, the Soviet Government acted as if Hitler was indebted to it for his successes elsewhere. Ignoring the noticeable chill emanating from Berlin, it presented the Reich government with endless petty demands and sour complaints: over a strip of Lithuanian territory (allocated to Germany) which it wanted to purchase; over the port facilities in Memel (now Klaipeda), which it claimed in the name of former Lithuania; over the lagging German deliveries; over the compensation of Germans evacuated to Germany from the Baltic states; over the presence of small German contingents in northern Finland; over inadequate German support of the Soviet claims made to Rumania; and, later, over not being recognized as a Danubian power. In July, after Sir Stafford Cripps, the newly-appointed British Ambassador to Moscow, had had a long talk with Stalin, Molotov pointedly told Schulenburg that the British favored the establishment of Soviet leadership in the Balkans and a Soviet military base in the Bosporus Straits. If anything, this hint made Hitler determined to limit further Soviet expansion. He instructed Ribbentrop to protest the Soviet seizure of Bukovina; and on August 30, having arbitrated the Hungarian-

[9] Schnurre memorandum, Feb. 26, 1940, *DGFP*, D, Vol. VIII, pp. 814-17. The Soviet Union undertook not only to supply over 3.5 million tons of ores, metals, and grains, but also to provide transit for goods going to Germany from the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Far East, and to act as a buyer of raw materials and metals for Germany in third countries.

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Rumanian dispute over Transylvania, he guaranteed the rump of Rumania against any further encroachments. This step evoked a sharp Soviet protest.

Towards Catastrophe

There are conflicting theories as to precisely when and why Hitler decided to invade Russia.[10] The reasons that impelled him to invite Molotov to come to Berlin in November 1940 may have been either to make a last-ditch attempt to reach an agreement with his Soviet ally, or to find out to what extent Stalin's ambitions clashed with his own. At any rate, on the day of Molotov's arrival, Hitler instructed his military chiefs to resume preparations for the invasion of England "in the spring of 1941"—a plan which could be carried out *only* if the attack on Russia were called off.[11]

During the Berlin talks, Hitler and Ribbentrop eloquently outlined to the titular head of the Soviet Government their grandiose plans for joint long-range policies and a delimitation of German, Italian, Japanese, and Russian interests. Molotov, visibly unimpressed, in turn spelled out the more mundane Soviet demands: *i.e.*, that Germany abandon its interest in the fate of Finland; that it agree to a Soviet protectorate over Bulgaria; and that it facilitate the establishment of Soviet control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Forced to talk about specifics, Hitler argued in vain that Finland should be left alone, that Soviet interests in the Black Sea could be secured without violating Turkey's territorial integrity, and that Bulgaria should at least be asked whether it wanted the Soviet guarantee. Molotov remained unmoved, and no decisions were arrived at.

Shortly after returning to Moscow, on November 26, 1940, Molotov handed Schulenburg a stiff formal answer to the German proposals. The Soviet Union was prepared to join Germany and its allies in an all-embracing Four-Power Pact provided: (a) that the Germans get out of Finland; (b) that "within the next few months" Bulgaria be recognized as belonging to the Soviet security zone, and that Soviet military bases be established "within range of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles"; (c) that the area south of Batum and Baku be "recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union"; and (d) that Japan renounce its rights to coal and oil concessions in Northern Sakhalin.[12]

Hitler did not reply to this note in spite of repeated Soviet inquiries. He quietly advised Finland, Rumania and Bulgaria to resist Soviet pressure, assuring all three of his support.[13] And on December 18, 1940, he issued Directive No. 21 ordering the German armed forces to be prepared "to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign." After that, except for minor discussions at the ambassadorial level, there were no more communications between Berlin and Moscow.

The Soviet Government's subsequent reaction to Berlin's ominous silence can be divided roughly into two stages. Up to about April 1941, Stalin acted on the conviction that Hitler would neither want nor dare to attack the Soviet Union. He ignored the buildup of German troops in Poland, East Prussia, and Rumania. He also resorted to a power play of his own by putting greater pressure on Bulgaria, by encouraging Turkey to join the British-sponsored "Balkan Front" against the Axis, by slowing down Soviet deliveries to Germany, and by negotiating a treaty of friendship with the pro-British regime of Yugoslavia—a move which infuriated Hitler.

After the swift German victory in the Balkans, the Soviet leaders went to the other extreme. Seized by mortal fear of a German attack—yet still refusing to believe in its imminence—they completely abandoned all political and military initiative and resorted to a series of pathetic gestures aimed at placating Hitler. In the early hours of June 22, 1941, as German motorized divisions crossed the whole length of the Soviet western border, Molotov had his last meeting with the German Ambassador. In reply to the declaration of war read to him by Schulenburg, he could only say, "Surely we have not deserved that."

History and Politics

In view of the upsurge of Soviet interest in the history of the Second World War, it is rather remarkable that the story related above has not yet been told there. This is no longer a question of ignorance. Although Soviet archives are still closed to research, the immense body of Western literature is readily available and widely used by Soviet scholars. Nevertheless, the subject of the Nazi-Soviet partnership, its origins and dissolution, has yet to find its Soviet historian. At present the references to this episode

[10] For this author's view, see forthcoming article in *Orbis*. For a different theory, see T. Higgins, *Hitler and Russia*, New York, Macmillan 1966, pp. ii-iv.

[11] See Directive No. 18, *DGFP*, D, Vol. XI, p. 531.

[12] *DGFP*, D, Vol. XI, pp. 714-15.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 661, 675-76, 722-23, 767-73.

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are so oblique, so fragmentary, and so scattered that one might be led to believe that it had very little, if anything, to do with the origins of the war.[14]

The "line" on the Nazi-Soviet Pact is unabashedly simple: The pact really had no prehistory; Stalin's decision to make a deal with Hitler was a last-minute reversal of the established policy aimed at the creation of an anti-Hitler alliance, a reversal dictated by the need to frustrate the perfidious schemes of the British and French "ruling circles" who were trying to induce Hitler to attack Russia, as well as by Soviet awareness of the danger of being boxed in between a hostile coalition in Europe and Japan in Asia.[15] The Anglo-French perfidy is a fashionable topic. Some Soviet historians go so far as to say that Chamberlain and Daladier declared war on Germany only because they became angry with Hitler after he had double-crossed them by concluding the pact with the Soviets. They also claim that even after the war started, France and Great Britain stubbornly persisted in their efforts to join Hitler in a holy crusade against the hated Soviet Union, especially during the Winter War in Finland, when anti-Soviet propaganda in the West reached an unprecedented pitch. The Winter War (itself one of the least popular subjects of study—the creation of the Kuusinen "government" of Finland, for instance, is never mentioned) is vaguely described as a farsighted effort to improve the Soviet strategic position, an effort which only committed anti-Communists can fail to appreciate.[16]

The United States, it seems, had actively promoted the anti-Soviet crusade since the mid-1930's. "Being interested in an outbreak of war across the ocean," states one Soviet scholar, "the United States, jointly with the British and the French, had undermined all Soviet attempts to organize a front of collective security," and when, "thanks to their efforts, the war got so much closer, they adopted a hands-off policy, happily watching the coming of Armageddon." [17] Other scholars are more specific. According to one, President Roosevelt sent Sumner Welles to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and London in February 1940 to "forge a united anti-Soviet front and to launch the war against the Soviet Union." [18]

No reference is to be found to the Secret Protocols of the Nazi-Soviet Pact or to the Boundary and Friendship Treaty delineating the Soviet and German spheres of interest in Eastern Europe. Stalin's attempts to lay hands on Bulgaria and the Straits are nowhere mentioned. There is not a hint anywhere that the conclusion of the Pact perhaps helped Hitler to unleash the war. By some feat of logic, one historian concluded that in making the compact with the Nazis, the Soviet Government had served the cause of freedom by farsightedly creating "proper conditions" for the eventual formation of the anti-Hitler coalition.[19] Soviet expansionism is unfailingly exonerated. The annexation of eastern Poland is described as an act of magnanimity prompted by a selfless desire to save hapless Ukrainians and Belorussians from "fascist slavery" after the collapse and shameful flight of the Polish government. Finland is depicted as a springboard which the enemy planned to use for the invasion of Russia. The enemy in this instance is strangely enough, not Germany, but Great Britain and France; nobody bothers to explain how, given Finland's geographic position, the British and French could have utilized the "springboard." The seizures of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bessarabia are usually presented as statesmanlike moves aimed at strengthening Russia's strategic position and restoring Russia's rightful heritage.

Soviet historical literature still contains the assertion that by concluding the Pact, Stalin gained time to prepare the Soviet Union for the eventual confrontation with Germany. This assertion is neither documented nor does it accord with such facts as the extensive Soviet economic aid to the Reich. The trade agreements are mentioned only in passing; their terms, so unfavorable to the Soviet Union, are never spelled out; and references to them are usually accompanied by pugnacious declarations that the USSR, being a "sovereign and neutral country," had a perfect right to

[14] Among other taboos are histories of Germany, of the Nazi movement, and the German Communist Party; of the Soviet-German collaboration following Rapallo; of the German military occupation of Russia; and of the East European regimes which helped the Reich during the war.

[15] See I. M. Maiski, *Kto pomogal Gitleru*, Moscow, 1962, and his *Vospominaniia sovetskovo posla: Voina*, Moscow, 1965. *Cf.* N. N. Yakovlev, "Poslednie dni mira," in *Protiv falsifikatsii istorii vtoroi mirovoi voiny*, Moscow, Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1964. One remarkable thing is that passages (and even whole articles) dealing with the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in Moscow in the summer of 1939 are almost wholly devoted to descriptions and analyses of the Anglo-French position, with only minor references to that of the Soviet Union.

[16] See V. G. Trukhanovski, "Anglo-sovetskie otnosheniia v nachale vtoroi mirovoi voiny," in *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, Politika Diplomatiia XVI-XX veka*, Moscow, 1964. From the majority of Soviet "studies" the reader gets the unmistakable impression that at least until Hitler's occupation of Denmark and Norway, Great Britain and France directed much more attention to preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union than to fighting Germany.

[17] Yakovlev, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

[18] *Istoriia mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii i vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Vol. II, 1939-1945, IMO, Moscow, 1962, pp. 38-39.

[19] Yakovlev, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-207.

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trade with whomever it pleased. At the same time, the cardinal fact that Germany, after the defeat of France, was a much more formidable adversary than it had been in August 1939 is never acknowledged, even in retrospect. Amidst fierce attacks on the treachery of the British and French in their negotiations with Moscow, one finds no suggestions that perhaps the Soviet government did not have to sit tight waiting for bids from abroad, but might have taken the initiative in reaching an understanding with Germany's Western opponents. In their desire to present their government as being above reproach, Soviet writers refuse to allow that after the Nazi-Soviet Pact many people in the West could perhaps legitimately regard Stalin as Hitler's accomplice.

Yet something obviously did go wrong, and that is why Soviet historians have such difficulty finding sensible explanations for the disastrous defeats of the first eighteen months of the war. Since the Soviet policy was "correct" and farsighted, the fault must lie somewhere else. The old line that the suddenness of the attack and Hitler's perfidy (the Soviets use the term *verolomstvo*, a "breach of faith") were responsible for Germany's spectacular successes is no longer convincing. On the other hand, the men whose careers have been devoted to the building of Soviet grandeur cannot admit that Germany was militarily stronger: nobody can be stronger than the Soviet Union.

One Day in the Life of Iosif Vissarionovich

The central culprit remains, of course, Stalin. But since it is dangerous—given the imperatives of the Soviet ideology—to cast the dead leader openly in the role of villain, Soviet writers have been restricted to talking about Stalin's "errors" roughly within the limits set in Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Party Congress. Various Soviet marshals, generals, and admirals, in recently-published memoirs defending their records, have pointed to specific instances of Stalin's "errors." But although for a while they were given a rather free hand in demolishing Stalin's image as a wartime military leader,[20] Stalin's political "errors" are a different story. So far there have been few attempts to catalogue them so as to create a coherent narrative of the events leading to the Great Patriotic War.

One exception is a book by A. M. Nekrich, a bona-fide diplomatic historian, entitled *1941, 22 iiunia* (June 22, 1941). It appeared in Moscow in 1965 under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences. Using Western documentation exclusively, but supplementing it with interviews with a number of generals who were involved in intelligence work before and during the war, Nekrich presents the case for the army and draws up a staggering indictment against the late leader: Stalin ignored Marshal Tukhachevski's warning that a sudden attack on the Soviet Union was part and parcel of the German military plans; he concocted, with the connivance of the Gestapo, a "monstrous plot" (*chudovishchanaia provokatsiia*) against the Red Army leadership (Nekrich quotes Marshal Bagramian as saying that the "extermination . . . of the outstanding military leaders was one of the major causes of our defeats in the early period of the war"); he placed his faith in Hitler and ordered the fortifications along the old Soviet-Polish border dismantled without promptly erecting new ones farther west; he clung to the rigid doctrine of offensive war and, imprudently overruling his military advisers, ordered strategic supplies of the Red Army and advance airfields placed in dangerous proximity to the new border. Most serious of all, Nekrich brings out the fact that Stalin ignored the flood of information about German preparations for the attack, information which came not only from foreign sources (*e.g.*, from Churchill and Welles) but to a very large extent from Soviet intelligence itself.

Nekrich's depiction of Stalin borders on the schizophrenic. On the one hand, he does not question Stalin's expansionist policies: in line with all other Soviet historians, he warmly commends him for his efforts to improve the strategic position of the Soviet Union, from the partitioning of Poland to the occupation of Bessarabia. He praises Stalin for his "peaceful intentions" and his "honesty" in fulfilling Soviet obligations to Germany. So eager is he to give Stalin "his due" that he even misrepresents the record—*e.g.*, by claiming that the Soviet Government "declined" a German offer to join the Tripartite Pact (pp. 98, 107), and that, under Stalin's leadership, European Communists in 1939-41 were in the forefront of the anti-Axis resistance (p. 119).

Nevertheless, the picture of Stalin that emerges from the book is anything but flattering. He appears as a bloodthirsty tyrant, stubborn and narrow-minded, who never doubted that his deal with Hitler was an act of

[20] Interesting revelations are found in many publications. See, for instance, Marshal Zhukov's memoirs in the October 1966 issue of *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), or A. Yakovlev's *Tsel zhizni*, Moscow, 1966. Yakovlev, a renowned builder of fighter planes, makes (on p. 208) the stunning assertion that the Nazi-Soviet Pact was concluded *after* the collapse of Poland and the rejection by the British and the French of all Soviet proposals to unite forces against Hitler's aggression!

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supreme statesmanship. Like other military writers,[21] Nekrich reserves his sharpest criticism for Stalin's behavior during the last two or three months before the invasion, when the evidence of impending disaster was overwhelming, and when Stalin dismissed it all as a sinister scheme of "imperialists" like Churchill and Roosevelt, who were anxious to see the Soviet Union clash with Germany.

Nekrich does not try to lay blame on Stalin for the official Soviet military doctrine which clung to the notion of "beating the enemy on his own territory" and assumed that the Red Army losses would be minimal thanks to the international solidarity of the toiling masses—a doctrine that greatly contributed to the debacle. But he does accuse him of refusing to put the armed forces in a state of alert on the eve of the invasion and of issuing the order not to pursue hundreds of German reconnaissance planes over Soviet territory (although the "traitor" Beria is also mentioned in this context), as well as the remarkable order to refrain from answering the fire of thousands of German tanks that had crossed the border in the early hours of June 22, 1941 (Stalin believed that this was merely a "provocation" on the part of some unruly German generals who, acting against the Führer's will, wanted to unleash a war).

Nowhere does Nekrich indicate that Stalin—however powerful—was not alone in placing so much faith in the Nazis, and that his closest advisers and collaborators never disagreed with him. But to question the "collective wisdom" of the party, or even to hint that the guilt should be shared by the leadership as a whole, would amount to rank apostasy under Soviet conditions.

What Price Truth?

The impact of Nekrich's book on Soviet readers was electrifying. At first it received a few favorable reviews—not surprisingly, in the liberal monthly *Novyi mir* (No. 7, 1966) and, less understandably, in *Komsomolets Tadzhikistana* (Jan. 9, 1966). For a while, Nekrich enjoyed considerable popularity; in June 1966, he was even elected corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. But by the beginning of 1967, the official attitude towards the historian began to harden, finally resulting in an outright—and most violent—condemnation of the book and its author. What caused this change—and so long after the appearance of the book at that—is difficult to determine with certainty. It is safe to assume, however, that it was related at least in part to a session of the Division of History of the Great Patriotic War at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, which reportedly took place in Moscow on February 16, 1966. At this meeting, a seemingly authentic summary of which appeared in a number of West European periodicals,[22] a few of the 130 historians present attempted to defend Stalin and Nekrich's treatment of him. The vast majority of the speakers, however, accused Nekrich of trying to exonerate the military chieftains who, by slavishly carrying out Stalin's wishes, had betrayed their duty to the country. The meeting was apparently stormy and rancorous, and it may well have alarmed both the generals and party *apparatchiks*, who may have seen in it an attack on the Soviet leadership *in toto*.

Be that as it may, Nekrich was attacked in the May 30, 1967, issue of the army newspaper *Krasnaia zvezda*, in an article entitled "The Memoirist and History." Undoubtedly reflecting the views of the Central Committee, the article spelled out the guidelines for military memoirists. It praised those who had concentrated on Soviet accomplishments in the war, and it condemned those who failed to see "behind the errors and miscalculations the truly titanic work done by the party and the people." Stressing the overwhelming importance of the ultimate Soviet victory over Germany, *Krasnaia zvezda* asserted that the "Supreme Commander J. V. Stalin, showing great fortitude, guided combat operations correctly on the whole, and rendered considerable services in the field."

In the same month of May, the journal *Voprosy istorii* came out with an article clearly aimed at "correcting" the unfortunate impressions created by Nekrich and like-minded historians. In 1939, said the anonymous authors of the article, "England and France, supported by the United States, did not want to conclude a mutual defense treaty with the USSR and were preparing to make a deal with Germany."

[21] See, for instance, Admiral Kuznetsov's reminiscences in *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 2, 1967. Like almost every other Soviet memoirist, Kuznetsov points out the disorganizing and disrupting effect of the TASS communique of June 14, 1941, which reasserted the excellent state of Soviet-German relations, denied that the movements of German troops had anything to do with the Soviet Union or that the Soviet government planned any precautionary measures, and ascribed all "rumors" to the contrary to the hostile elements anxious to stir up trouble between the two countries. Since TASS was recognized throughout the Soviet Union as an unimpeachable voice of the leadership, the military commanders could take precautionary measures only at their own risk.

[22] *Le Nouvel Observateur* (Paris), Dec. 14, 1966. The story also appeared in *La Sinistra* (Rome), *Der Spiegel* (Stuttgart), and *Possev* (Stuttgart).

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Therefore, on August 23 (and not a day earlier!) the Soviet Union

was forced to accept Germany's offer and sign a non-aggression pact, thereby avoiding a trap set by the authors of the Munich policy, who had hoped to provoke a collision between the USSR and Germany. This was a farsighted act of Soviet foreign policy which extended peace for our country and permitted it to prepare better for repelling the aggressor.

In July 1967, Nekrich was ousted from the party by order of the Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee.[23] His book was no longer available by that time. Finally, in the September 1967 issue of *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Problems of History of the CPSU), Nekrich was directly attacked on the supreme authority of the Central Committee itself. In a 14-page article, titled "In Ideological Captivity of the Falsifiers of History," two top experts on military history from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism bitterly assailed every single position taken by Nekrich in his book. The Nazi-Soviet Pact, they asserted, was a unique accomplishment of Stalin in that it assured the eventual defeat of Germany; the United States remained bitterly hostile to the Soviet Union at least until mid-June of 1941; and Stalin had plenty of reasons to distrust Churchill, who had long hated the Soviet state and had always been eager to provoke a clash between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Voprosy istorii KPSS further asserted that Stalin had no fear of Germany and that he assumed the premiership in May 1941 not in order to placate Hitler (as Schulenburg concluded in his analytical report of May 12), but "in order to rally the nation even more in the anticipation of a possible German attack." There were no doubts or hesitations, miscalculations or confusion, among the military leaders when the attack came, and Nekrich's suggestions (no mention was made of the recent memoirs of military figures) that the "fascist armies did not meet any serious resistance at the border" was termed a monstrous slander. Time and again, the hapless author of *June 22, 1941* was accused of being a "traitor to the scientific principles of Marxist historiography," an "admirer" of Hitler (!), and one who, by his despicable concoction, provided the "ideologists of imperialism" with weapons in their "hostile and slanderous propaganda against the Soviet Union." At the end, the Academy of Sciences was reprimanded for "displaying irresponsibility" in permitting the publication of such a "politically harmful book."

Soviet historiography on the Nazi-Soviet Pact and its principal architect, Stalin, thus seems to have come full circle. Any serious criticism of Stalin's political wisdom is now, apparently, tantamount to "treason," and any objective account of Germany's military successes is equated with "admiration" of the Nazis. Yet, if the impact of "*l'affaire* Nekrich" on the Soviet leadership ought not to be underestimated, neither should its impact on the political temper of the population at large. *June 22, 1941* has by now become a bibliographic rarity in the USSR. The alleged stenographic record of the historians' meeting has been circulating among Soviet students. The September issue of *Voprosy istorii KPSS* was sold out completely the day it appeared on the newsstands.[24] The party, of course, is so anxious to prove its infallibility that it is prepared to devillainize Stalin, even if that means resorting to quasi-Stalinist methods. Given its power to control historical research and publications and to punish those who fail to fall into line, it can certainly succeed in this undertaking. Yet the damage has been done, and the faith of the citizens in their party, once enforced by sheer terror and lies, can no longer be restored. The word, as an old Russian proverb has it, is not like a sparrow—once it is uncooped, there is no retrieving it.

[23] *The Times* (London), July 8, 1967; *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), July 27, 1967.

[24] Kyril Tidmarsh in *The Times* (London), Oct. 6, 1967.

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L'Affaire Nekrich: Pages from the Record

Nekrich on Stalin

J. V. Stalin tried not to give Germany grounds for attacking the USSR. In spite of all the evidence, Stalin was convinced that Hitlerite Germany would not dare to destroy the non-aggression pact and attack the Soviet Union. This conviction led him to underestimate the aggressive nature of Hitlerite Germany. The international situation was quickly changing and becoming more complex. The course of events was breaking down the artificial scheme of international relations that Stalin had created. But he continued stubbornly to cling to it. He thought as before that England was merely looking for an opportunity to provoke a Soviet-German conflict. . . .

Whatever conclusions Stalin came to, nothing can justify his refusal to take elementary precautions in case a German attack should, after all, take place.

—From **22 June 1941**, *pp. 126, 136.*

Novyi Mir *on Nekrich*

. . . Was it possible to avoid such colossal losses, or were they unavoidable, having been dictated by fatal coincidence and by the inevitability of their objective causes?

An absolutely honest, direct answer was given in the . . . resolution of the CC of the CPSU of June 30, 1956, "On the Overcoming of the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences," which contains a forthright discussion of the serious error tolerated by Stalin "in the organization of the preparation of the country for the repulse of the fascist invader."

Yes. The number of sacrifices could have been significantly smaller if the heroic forces of the people, of all its strata, had not been hindered . . . by the circumstances resulting from the Stalinist cult of personality. In A. Nekrich's book, the reader will learn, for the first time, about a whole series of facts which bear testimony to it. . . . The book is written by a qualified, specialized historian. However, across the steady, efficient rhythm of well thought out and finely honed formulations, there breaks through to the reader the troubled voice of the contemporary of these events—that of a citizen of the country, its historian, defender, military officer, who returned after the victorious completion of the war to his peacetime profession of scholar without forgetting or losing any of the thoughts or feelings that possessed him at that time. And this infuses the book with a special dramatic tension, fills it with the sort of atmosphere of truth and authenticity that could not be manufactured, and gives it enormous emotional power.

—From "Measures of Responsibility," by G. Fedotov, **Novyi mir** *(Moscow), No. 1, 1966, pp. 261-263.*

The Last Word?

. . . [Nekrich's] petty work [is] written in the spirit of bourgeois historiography . . . Its author, adhering to a false methodology, departed from the Communist Party spirit of research and displayed lack of principle in his selection and appraisal of factual material . . . He deliberately distorts the foreign and domestic policies of the CPSU and the Soviet government . . . A. M. Nekrich attributes no importance to the ideological-political unity of Soviet society, a unity that arose on the basis of the victory of socialism . . . [He] did not want to understand that the staunchness of the Soviet fighting men was based firstly on loyalty to the ideas of socialism, to the cause of the Communist Party . . . Immeasurably delighted with his own "courage," . . . [he] melted the critic of *Novyi mir*, who discovered a special "objectivity" in the line taken in this petty book . . . [and who] availed himself of it as a pretext to appear in print with his own ideas, far from the real truth of history.

. . . . Like a dyed-in-the-wool bourgeois historian, [Nekrich] concentrated his attention on personalities and left aside the social classes behind those personalities . . . [He] admires Hitler's cunning and makes it appear that Germany alone needed the pact . . . [He] whitewashes the action of the governments of the USA and Britain . . . [His] improbity as a scholar is . . . evidenced by the methods of exaggeration and distortion . . . [His] claim that the Soviet government would have satisfied any demands of Germany, even territorial demands, to avoid war . . . is nothing less than unfounded denunciation of the Soviet leadership . . . [He] vilifies Soviet military science . . . He spares neither words nor epithets to denigrate the Soviet military leadership . . . [He] makes a monstrous charge against the Soviet soldiers when he says that "the fascist armies met with no serious resistance at the frontier." . . . .

This is how A. M. Nekrich, who found himself in ideological captivity to the bourgeois falsifiers of history, betrayed the scientific principles of Marxist historiography and consequently of historical truth. As was natural, his petty book turned out to be a find for the ideologists of imperialism, who adopted it as a weapon for hostile propaganda against and slander of the Soviet Union. The Science Publishing House behaved irresponsibly by issuing this politically pernicious book.

—From "In Ideological Captivity to Falsifiers of History," by G. A. Deborin & B. S. Telpukhovski, **Voprosy istorii KPSS** *(Moscow), No. 9, Sept. 1967. English translation in* **The Current Digest of the Soviet Press** *(New York), Vol. XIX, No. 42, pp. 11-17*

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NOTES & VIEWS

Moscow and the Third World

Power Politics or Revolution?

By Herbert Dinerstein

More than a decade has passed since the Soviet Union abandoned Stalin's more limited policy of seeking to dominate only neighboring countries and began attempting to extend its influence to non-contiguous, non-socialist countries. Perhaps it it not too soon to essay a general appraisal of these efforts. Such an assessment must center on underdeveloped countries, because Soviet opportunities and activities in industrialized, non-bordering countries have been comparatively modest.

Soviet activity in underdeveloped countries seems to divide naturally into three categories, each representing a higher rung on the scale of objectives. The first is the denial of neutral and, in most cases, recently decolonized areas to Western, and lately, Chinese influence. The second goal is intrusion into the area of an opponent's influence. This has occurred mostly in sovereign states where the opponent was presumed to enjoy considerable economic and political influence—the semi-colonies or the areas of neo-colonial influence. The third goal is the promotion of socialist revolution. For each category the rationale for policy, its execution, and the extent to which practice has modified theory will be examined.

Denying an opponent influence in neutral areas is a familiar feature of great-power politics. In the last decade more Soviet resources and efforts have been devoted to this goal than to intrusion into an opponent's area of control or to the foundation of new Communist states. It was because this limited goal seemed to promise the most success that it required greater investment than the more ambitious goals of intrusion and revolution.

Stalin assumed that neutral areas did not exist, that the imperial powers still effectively controlled the former colonies, and that in some cases colonial rule might even be restored. But Stalin, dogmatic and slow as he was to perceive change in the world, did not shut his eyes to salient facts —such as, for instance, the Indian policy of neutrality in the Korean War. Thus, even before Stalin's death, the two-camp theory was modified. After his death, Soviet power was employed to consolidate the independence of the former colonies and even, cautiously, to move these countries toward the Soviet camp. But support of colonies still struggling for independence was modest and often only verbal. In their na-

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tional liberation struggles, Indonesia, North Vietnam, and Algeria received very little besides advice from the Soviet Union. This was largely because the Soviet Union believed that the balance of power had to be modified before it could support national liberation movements in the Third World in any meaningful sense.

In the several years following the Korean War, the gap between American and Soviet military power was at its widest. During the Korean War, the American military position had improved more rapidly and extensively than the Soviet, particularly in nuclear weapons. But the Soviet Union expected that in a few years the military balance would be significantly altered by its acquisition of nuclear weapons, and especially missiles (which the Soviet leaders probably hoped to possess exclusively for a longer period than was actually the case). While building up its arsenal, the Soviet Union was reluctant to confront the Western powers, both because of its fear of conflict and because it wanted to contain the tempo of the arms race so that it could improve its military position with no greater expenditure of resources than it wanted to, or could, divert to that purpose. Hence Soviet intervention in the politics of the Third World was confined to dealing with sovereign countries, as opposed to assisting embattled colonies. As it turned out, when the relative Soviet military position actually did improve, Moscow was still unable to pursue a more aggressive policy in the Third World, for reasons which will be examined below.

In pursuing their goals in the former colonies, the Soviet leaders have been confronted with numerous difficulties. To begin with, politics in these areas have been notoriously unstable. Between the two world wars, the Soviet Union was able to deal with leaders who were relatively permanent features of the political landscape—*e.g.*, Mustapha Kemal and Chiang Kai-shek. Since World War II, however, Third World leaders have enjoyed relatively brief—if spectacular—careers: Ben Bella, Nkrumah and even Sukarno have come and gone. Only Nasser seems to have staying power. Thus, the Soviet Union must now support a succession of clients and frequently renegotiate its relationship to them. Accordingly, a particular policy has often been discarded along with the native political leader identified with it.

Another feature of politics in former colonies is that the new political leaders can play off one great power against another, either by accepting their simultaneous support or by abandoning one benefactor for another. This has led some observers to say that politicians in underdeveloped countries cannot be bought, but only rented. This remark, cynical though it may be, is not without validity. For if the Soviet leaders expected that money could buy important political influence, repeated disappointments must have sobered their judgment. Their decisions to offer large-scale economic aid either had been made during the period of early euphoria, or were assumed to be necessary to preempt the opponent in establishing his influence.

Egypt, Indonesia, and India were the primary examples of large-scale Soviet investment. In both the Egyptian and the Indonesian cases, the investment was large enough from the outset to discourage competition on the same scale. If influence had followed gold, the Soviet Union should have been clearly preponderant in Egypt and Indonesia, but it was not. It merely had the privilege of paying most of the bills. Men like to believe that they choose their mistresses and that they subsequently have a claim on their faithfulness. But often it is the mistress who selects her lover and decides how faithful she will be. Moreover, once the lady has been publicly displayed, the lover can only abandon her at considerable cost to his self-esteem and reputation, because everybody will believe that he has been deserted. For the Soviet Union to cut off the Indonesians, the Egyptians, or the Algerians because they publicly disregard Soviet *amour propre*, not to speak of Soviet interests, would be to admit political defeat. To hang on, even on humiliating terms, is better than to let go. The recent Soviet decision to resupply Egypt and "hang on" is a case in point.

Nor have the political costs of denying influence to others been negligible. The eagerness of the great powers to win over leaders in the Third World puts the former in a poor bargaining position. The United States must often tolerate the expropriation of its foreign properties, and the Chinese must acquiesce in discrimination against their countrymen overseas. If Ben Bella wants to absorb the Communist Party into his own, if Nasser wants to jail Communists, and if the Indonesian leaders want to slaughter them *en masse*, the Soviet Union can only gulp and administer a very polite scolding.

Had the political position of the USSR improved to the same extent as its military prowess, its leaders might perhaps have been able to insist on receiving something in return from the beneficiaries of their largess. Indeed, it had been generally assumed that with Moscow's acquisition of nuclear power, a corresponding increase in its political influence would follow. Furthermore, had this power been employed successfully to score political gains in industrialized Europe, Third World leaders might well have considered it wise to accomodate themselves to the "wave of the future." Under conditions of a nuclear stalemate, however, these leaders have found it advantageous to maneuver between the two major nuclear powers. As for the latter, their rivalry has tended to abate whenever either one or both realized that a given country would not submit to the

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other's domination. To put it differently, whenever each player realized that the other's goals were limited to the denial of his opponent's preponderant influence, the friction between them would be replaced either by a *modus vivendi* or even by a policy of limited cooperation. Soviet-American policies towards India are a case in point, and the treatment of post-Sukarno Indonesia may yet fall in the same category.

Relations between Moscow and Peking are another matter. Neither of them thinks in terms of sharing influence with the other. Unlike the Soviet Union's competition with non-socialist powers, its relations with China are on an all-or-nothing basis. Perhaps this partly explains the massive Soviet support once given to the Indonesian army, the consequences of which must be accounted as one of the major disasters to international communism.

An appraisal of the Soviet Union's success in its attempts to deny influence to others depends very much on one's assumptions. If one assumes that the 1957 Anglo-French intervention in Egypt was evidence that the former imperial powers were just itching to regain their colonies, one might conclude that Soviet action served to frustrate that ambition. If, on the contrary, one assumes that the former imperial powers had little stomach for keeping their empires, then it follows that the Soviet leaders succeeded in denying their opponents something they did not want in any case.

Soviet leaders may derive some satisfaction from having a voice in events all over the globe, rather than merely along their own borders. The USSR now enjoys a position in the Mediterranean and influence in Southern Asia, but this does not mean that it has inherited anything like the British position in Burma, India, Egypt, or—even during the Ben Bella period—the French position in Algeria. In the latter part of the twentieth century, it is the small and weak powers which make claims on the great powers and not—as during the period of colonialism—*vice versa*. Perhaps Stalin saw more clearly than his successors how little the Third World had to offer the Soviet Union.

Intrusion into an opponent's sphere of influence may range from modest encouragement of nationalist forces within that camp (*e.g.*, American policy in Eastern Europe) to sponsorship of an active challenger to an adversary (*e.g.*, Soviet support of Castro against the United States since 1959). The idea behind this strategy—namely, that to diminish an opponent is automatically to enhance oneself—seems so obvious that both sides apply it without questioning its validity. Therefore, if winning this contest is defined as loosening an opponent's hold on parts of the underdeveloped world, one would expect the Soviet Union to be more successful than the United States, if only because the United States has much more to lose, and because all the great powers seem fated to relinquish their influence over underdeveloped countries. Of Moscow's unindustrialized allies, only Bulgaria and Mongolia remain, China and Albania having dramatically asserted their independence. (Moscow and Peking continue to compete for the allegiance of North Vietnam and North Korea.)

On the other hand, although the United States has already lost Iraq and Cuba, it still retains—and hence is liable to lose—its position of influence in the rest of Latin America and the member countries of CENTO and SEATO. A Soviet policy of limited action, or even inaction, in these areas will probably coincide with diminished American influence, simply because assertive nationalism is on the ascendance and Vietnam is making the thought of new American contests with nationalist movements very unpopular in the United States. Thus, a Soviet policy of ringing declarations

Friendly Comments

. . . the Arabs have no more loyal or greater friend than the Soviet Union, and there is no other support apart from this friendship. . . . What the Soviet Union did for the Arabs before, during, and after the (Israeli) crisis is greater and more important than can be told. And all Egyptian patriots and revolutionaries are convinced that our hope for the future is founded on two things: the guidance of our people by Gamal Abdel Nasser and the friendship of the Arabs with the Soviet Union.

—Mohammed Odah (UAR journalist), in **Pravda, Dec. 6, 1967.**

By setting up NATO, the United States extended its network of military bases from Spain to Turkey and put its 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean to play the part of gendarme in the vast Mediterranean region. It is enough to recall the US Marines landing in Lebanon. Look at the map: it is as if the Pentagon were trying to set up a military barrier between the socialist world and the burgeoning third world.

—Pravda, Dec. 3, 1967.

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in support of nationalist movements may be very potent. Either the opponent (the United States in most cases) will accept the diminution of his authority, or react forcefully (as in the Dominican Republic), thus encouraging nationalism abroad and isolationism at home. In either case, American authority would thus erode, with little if any Soviet assistance; the Soviet Union would be the beneficiary of a process of disintegration, rather than its cause.

The Soviet Union's aid to Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, its offers of assistance to the Brazil of Goulart and Castello Branco, its economic and military aid to Iran in 1966, and the offer of the same to Turkey in 1967 were all modest intrusions into the US sphere of influence. All these countries are part of the United States alliance systems, but are also potential challengers of American influence. They might continue to collaborate with the United States despite acceptance of Soviet aid, but since the United States stands to lose so much if they withdraw their cooperation, modest Soviet investment is clearly justified.

Hence, for the most part, the Soviet Union has supported legal governments, rather than revolutionary movements, within the American system of alliances. The United States can hardly characterize as an unfriendly act the Soviet sale of arms or other goods to governments with which the United States is on good terms, such as Iran, Brazil, or Chile. Since the Soviet Union is not trying to outbid the United States, but merely to increase tensions between that country and its clients by putting the latter in a better bargaining position, the amounts of aid can be quite small. Modest assistance enables President Frei of Chile or the Shah of Iran to negotiate with the United States from a position of greater strength. If the United States should, as a gesture of disapproval, cease its economic aid to Iran, it would thereby lose an important position in the Middle East and simultaneously improve Soviet chances in that part of the world. As long as the Soviet Union thinks that the diminution of American influence is to its advantage (and such may not always be the case), the temptation to make substantial gain at little cost and risk will continue.

Before the failure of its attempt to blackmail the United States in West Berlin and the forced withdrawal of its missiles from Cuba, the Soviet Union alternately presented the aspects of ravening tiger and pussycat. It was failure rather than a sudden sense of sin that made the tiger withdraw and give the pussycat the chief role. But this forced conversion is not without its secondary benefits for the USSR. In the past, Russia's neighbors were too frightened by Soviet power to be willing to forego American protection, but not enough to force them to make any concessions to Moscow. The Soviet leaders are no longer so foolish as to bear the onus of a great power which makes demands upon the weak without getting its way.

Soviet decision-makers can easily justify a policy of intruding into areas of an opponent's influence. It requires small expenditure, the political cost of failure is negligible, and the potential damage to the opponent is great. Nor is there a "right wing" in the Soviet legislature decrying its government's penchant for "trading with the capitalists who are committing aggression in Vietnam." The policy of intrusion has the additional advantage of going hand in hand with its policy of denying an opponent a chance to reestablish lost influence. Whatever motivated Soviet rapprochement with Iran, the result is Soviet support of the major rival to Egyptian ambitions in the Persian Gulf, which affords Moscow some leverage in its relations with Cairo. Improved Soviet relations with Pakistan not only reduce Chinese influence in that country, but improve the Soviet bargaining position with India. By furnishing conditional support to Frei, who promises a revolution from above, the Soviet Union reduces the bargaining power of its Cuban client. If one has two clients with conflicting interests in an area, the pressure that each can apply on the great power is diminished.

It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Union will continue to find the diminution of American authority in Latin America or Southeast Asia automatically advantageous. One could easily imagine circumstances in which the Soviet Union might not consider the control of Singapore by political forces friendly to China, or an extension of Castro's influence at the expense of the United States, to be in its best interests. But at present one would expect that the Soviet Union would automatically respond to opportunities to reduce the power of its principal opponent, the United States, especially in countries bordering on the Soviet Union.

In the view of many Western observers, the Soviet Union has constantly been preoccupied with the creation of new Communist governments; some Communists, on the other hand, have judged the Soviet Union to be shamefully negligent of its revolutionary duty. To the non-Communist states, the attempt to communize countries by force, and the actual communization of Eastern Europe, represent the norm of Soviet behavior that will be repeated whenever opportunity offers. To some of its allies, the Soviet Union's grudging or non-existent support of revolutionary movements is the characteristic feature of its behavior. Soviet leaders deny, of course, that they export revolution, yet insist that they have done more to spread communism than anyone else. Quite naturally, they are faced with what is nowadays called a credibility problem.

Since changes in Soviet doctrine on

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transition to communism have already been described by this author elsewhere,[1] only a brief review will be offered here. As early as 1920, Soviet theoreticians developed the idea of a two-stage revolution for colonial areas, according to which the Communists would participate in a "national" uprising directed against imperialism, in order to transform it eventually into a "socialist" revolution directed against the native bourgeoisie and aimed at the establishment of a Communist society. Whatever the theoretical merits of this prescription, the fact remains that in fifty years of declining colonial rule, there have been remarkably few successful "two-stage" revolutions. The early cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese CP might seem, at first glance, a good illustration of the application of this doctrine, had it not come to such an ignominious end. True, during the Sino-Japanese war the Kuomintang and the Communists fought a common enemy, but it is only by straining the facts that one can term this an alliance in any meaningful sense of the word. The only apposite case is that of the Communist victory in North Vietnam —achieved, one is tempted to point out, in spite of indirect Soviet interference (*i.e.*, the political support by the French CP of France's effort to retain Indo-China in the late 1940's).

As for the first stage of the Cuban revolution, the Communist Party participated in it only at the very end. Furthermore, Castro's conversion to communism is hardly a case of a Communist party taking over the second stage of the revolution. On the contrary, it was Castro who absorbed the Communist Party. Most recently, Soviet writers have put forward the theory that in states with no Communist parties, a revolution can be made by non-proletarian parties which would become fully Marxist after seizing power. Small wonder that underground Communists in underdeveloped countries, believing that their own revolution can succeed, feel betrayed when Moscow favors their "national bourgeois" adversaries.

Underdeveloped countries have found it possible to mistreat or even liquidate local Communist parties without losing Soviet support, because —no matter what befalls the local Communists—the Soviets are unwilling to abandon such countries to the influence of another great power. It has been suggested that Soviet acquiescence in the absorption of a Communist party by a non-Communist party be termed "licensed infiltration." The term is meaningful only if in the end communism succeeds in controlling the country in question. Otherwise betrayal is a more appropriate word—as was the case in Algeria. In Indonesia, it is not clear whether the Soviet Union furnished crucial support to the Indonesian armed forces in order to deny that opportunity to the United States, or because it hoped, by creating a counterforce to the Communist Party of Indonesia, to increase its influence over that movement. Whatever the motives, or mixture of motives, the result was counterrevolutionary. In most cases in the last decade, the Soviet Union has chosen to deny neutral areas to opposing influence and to penetrate an opponent's established sphere of influence, rather than to promote revolution. In other words, it has preferred the interests of the Soviet state to the interests of revolutionary communism.

Changes in American policy have furnished the rationalization for—or, depending on one's point of view, have been the cause of—Soviet restraint. The Kennedy administration greatly increased the strength and mobility of its all-purpose forces, which made it easier to intervene whenever and wherever it seemed that a Communist takeover was in the offing. The Soviet Union can argue, and probably sincerely, that most Communist attempts to seize power are premature and therefore doomed to failure, and that its more peaceful pursuit of influence in the Third World may eventually create more favorable conditions for Communist seizures of power. But when a Communist party is nevertheless engaged in a revolutionary struggle, the Soviet Union is under heavy pressure to furnish some kind of support. It seems quite clear that the Soviet Union's support of the Communist cause in South Vietnam has been reluctant and indirect, being confined to aid to North Vietnam, which is a state under attack. Whatever one might believe about the success of American policy in Vietnam, the war is clearly a disaster for the Soviet Union.[2] The fear of having to face similar prolonged conflicts probably explains much of the Soviet prudence in supporting Communists who want to strike out for power.

However prudent, Soviet leaders probably think of themselves as experienced revolutionaries who know best when to be bold. Soviet policy-making, like that of most countries, probably represents a compromise between the prudent and the impetuous. When events force a choice upon them, their differences must be resolved in terms of the concrete situation. Thus, in the summer of 1967, after some hesitation, the Soviets decided to continue their support of the "progressive" Arab states. This suggests that the Soviet leaders still believe that their policy of preempting influence in neutral areas merits the assumption of sizable political and economic costs.

[1] H. Dinerstein, "Soviet Policy in Latin America," *The American Political Science Review* (Madison, Wisconsin), Vol. LXI, No. 1, March 1967.

[2] For a different opinion on this subject, see Mr. Croan's review of books on Vietnam, p. 34.—*Ed.*

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